CASE BRIEF
A case brief should be 1-2 pages. (250-500 words) The brief for each case should be submitted before the date on the work schedule. Be prepared to discuss your brief in class.
Facts: Summarize the facts of the case. List only the essential facts that you need to understand the holding and reasoning of the case.
Procedure: Most of the cases that you'll read in law school will be appellate court decisions. In this section, you want to list what happened in the lower court(s). Do not go into too much detail. One or two sentences are sufficient for this section.
Issue(s): What is/are the question(s) facing the court? Form the issue questions in a way that they can be answered by yes or no.
Holding: How did the court answer the issue question(s)? YES/NO?
Reasoning: This is the most important section of your case brief. Here you want to list the reasoning of the majority in reaching its decision. You can actually be quite detailed in this section. List what the law was before this case was decided and how the law has changed after this decision. Law professors love to discuss the reasoning of a case in class discussions.
Concurring/dissenting opinions: Even though I read the concurring and dissenting opinions, I rarely brief them. However, there are some cases (e.g. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer) where the concurring or dissenting opinions end up becoming more important than the majority's opinions. In such cases, you should add this section to your case brief.
Chapter 10 - County of Riverside v. McLaughlin and a Prompt Hearing before a Magistrate -
In this case the
US Supreme Court determined that a “prompt” hearing is defined as one given
within a 48 hour period. This, however, does not mean that the hearing was not
delayed, if the defendant can prove that the hearing was “delayed unreasonably.”
The court used the case Gerstein v. Pugh `which used the Fourth Amendment to
determine what a prompt hearing was in relation to a warrantless arrest and
detention. The court also determined that the defendants had “standing” to bring
this indictment.
The majority opinion was taken from the website:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/89-1817.ZO.html
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), this Court held that the Fourth
Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a
prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention following a warrantless arrest.
This case requires us to define what is "prompt" under Gerstein.
I. This is a class action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging the manner in
which the County of Riverside, California (County), provides probable cause
determinations to persons arrested without a warrant. At issue is the County's
policy of combining probable cause determinations with its arraignment
procedures. Under County policy, which tracks closely the provisions of Cal.
Penal Code Ann. 825 (West 1985), arraignments must be conducted without
unnecessary delay and, in any event, within two days of arrest. This two-day
requirement excludes from computation weekends and holidays. Thus, an individual
arrested without a warrant late in the week may in some cases be held for as
long as five days before receiving a probable cause determination. Over the
Thanksgiving holiday, a 7-day delay is possible.
The parties dispute whether the combined probable cause/ arraignment procedure
is available to all warrantless arrestees. Testimony by Riverside County
District Attorney Grover Trask suggests that individuals arrested without
warrants for felonies do not receive a probable cause determination until the
preliminary hearing, which may not occur until 10 days after arraignment. (2
App. 298-299). Before this Court, however, the County represents that its policy
is to provide probable cause determinations at arraignment for all persons
arrested without a warrant, regardless of the nature of the charges against
them. Ibid. See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 13. We need not resolve the factual
inconsistency here. For present purposes, we accept the County's representation.
In August 1987, Donald Lee McLaughlin filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California, seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief on behalf of himself and " `all others similarly situated.' "
The complaint alleged that McLaughlin was then currently incarcerated in the
Riverside County Jail and had not received a probable cause determination. He
requested " `an order and judgment requiring that the defendants and the County
of Riverside provide in-custody arrestees, arrested without warrants, prompt
probable cause, bail and arraignment hearings.' " (Pet. for Cert. 6). Shortly
thereafter, McLaughlin moved for class certification. The County moved to
dismiss the complaint, asserting that McLaughlin lacked standing to bring the
suit because he had failed to show, as required by Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95 (1983), that he would again be subject to the allegedly unconstitutional
conduct -- i. e., a warrantless detention without a probable cause
determination.
In light of the pending motion to dismiss, the District Court continued the
hearing on the motion to certify the class. Various papers were submitted; then,
in July 1988, the District Court accepted for filing a second amended complaint,
which is the operative pleading here. From the record it appears that the
District Court never explicitly ruled on defendants' motion to dismiss, but
rather took it off the court's calendar in August 1988.
The second amended complaint named three additional plaintiffs -- Johnny E.
James, Diana Ray Simon, and Michael Scott Hyde -- individually and as class
representatives. The amended complaint alleged that each of the named plaintiffs
had been arrested without a warrant, had received neither prompt probable cause
nor bail hearings, and was still in custody. (1 App. 3). In November 1988, the
District Court certified a class comprising "all present and future prisoners in
the Riverside County Jail including those pretrial detainees arrested without
warrants and held in the Riverside County Jail from August 1, 1987 to the
present, and all such future detainees who have been or may be denied prompt
probable cause, bail or arraignment hearings." (1 App. 7).
In March 1989, plaintiffs asked the District Court to issue a preliminary
injunction requiring the County to provide all persons arrested without a
warrant a judicial determination of probable cause within 36 hours of arrest. 1
App. 21. The District Court issued the injunction, holding that the County's
existing practice violated this Court's decision in Gerstein. Without
discussion, the District Court adopted a rule that the County provide probable
cause determinations within 36 hours of arrest, except in exigent circumstances.
The court "retained jurisdiction indefinitely" to ensure that the County
established new procedures that complied with the injunction. (2 App. 333-334).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated this case
with another challenging an identical preliminary injunction issued against the
County of San Bernardino. See McGregor v. County of San Bernardino, decided with
McLaughlin v. County of Riverside, 888 F. 2d 1276 (1989).
On November 8, 1989, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order granting the
preliminary injunction against Riverside County. One aspect of the injunction
against San Bernardino County was reversed by the Court of Appeals; that
determination is not before us.
The Court of Appeals rejected Riverside County's Lyons- based standing argument,
holding that the named plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring the class
action for injunctive relief. (888 F. 2d, at 1277). It reasoned that, at the
time plaintiffs filed their complaint, they were in custody and suffering injury
as a result of the defendants' allegedly unconstitutional action. The court then
proceeded to the merits and determined that the County's policy of providing
probable cause determinations at arraignment within 48 hours was "not in accord
with Gerstein's requirement of a determination `promptly after arrest' " because
no more than 36 hours were needed "to complete the administrative steps incident
to arrest." Id., at 1278.
The Ninth Circuit thus joined the Fourth and Seventh Circuits in interpreting
Gerstein as requiring a probable cause determination immediately following
completion of the administrative procedures incident to arrest. Llaguno v. Min
gey, 763 F. 2d 1560, 1567-1568 (CA7 1985) (en banc); Fisher v. Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 690 F. 2d 1133, 1139-1141 (CA4 1982). By
contrast, the Second Circuit understands Gerstein to "stress the need for
flexibility" and to permit States to combine probable cause determinations with
other pretrial proceedings. Williams v. Ward, 845 F. 2d 374, 386 (1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1020 (1989). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict
among the Circuits as to what constitutes a "prompt" probable cause
determination under Gerstein.
II. As an initial matter, the County renews its claim that plaintiffs lack
standing. It explains that the main thrust of plaintiffs' suit is that they are
entitled to "prompt" probable cause determinations and insists that this is, by
definition, a time-limited violation. Once sufficient time has passed, the
County argues, the constitutional violation is complete because a probable cause
determination made after that point would no longer be "prompt." Thus, at least
as to the named plaintiffs, there is no standing because it is too late for them
to receive a prompt hearing and, under Lyons, they cannot show that they are
likely to be subjected again to the unconstitutional conduct.
We reject the County's argument. At the core of the standing doctrine is the
requirement that a plaintiff "alleged personal injury fairly traceable to the
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), citing Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). The County does not dispute that, at the time
the second amended complaint was filed, plaintiffs James, Simon, and Hyde had
been arrested without warrants and were being held in custody without having
received a probable cause determination, prompt or otherwise. Plaintiffs alleged
in their complaint that they were suffering a direct and current injury as a
result of this detention, and would continue to suffer that injury until they
received the probable cause determination to which they were entitled. Plainly,
plaintiffs' injury was at that moment capable of being re- dressed through
injunctive relief. The County's argument that the constitutional violation had
already been "completed" relies on a crabbed reading of the complaint. This case
is easily distinguished from Lyons, in which the constitutionally objectionable
practice ceased altogether before the plaintiff filed his complaint.
It is true, of course, that the claims of the named plaintiffs have since been
rendered moot; eventually, they either received probable cause determinations or
were released. Our cases leave no doubt, however, that by obtaining class
certification, plaintiffs preserved the merits of the controversy for our
review. In factually similar cases we have held that "the termination of a class
representative's claim does not moot the claims of the unnamed members of the
class." See, e. g., Gerstein, 420 U. S., at 110-111, n. 11, citing Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256, n. 3 (1984).
That the class was not certified until after the named plaintiffs' claims had
become moot does not deprive us of jurisdiction. We recognized in Gerstein that
"some claims are so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have
even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed
representative's individual interest expires." United States Parole Comm'n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 399 (1980), citing Gerstein, supra, at 110, n. 11. In
such cases, the "relation back" doctrine is properly invoked to preserve the
merits of the case for judicial resolution. See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204,
213-214, n. 11 (1978); Sosna, supra, at 402, n. 11. Accordingly, we proceed to
the merits.
III.
A. In Gerstein, this Court held unconstitutional Florida procedures under which
persons arrested without a warrant could remain in police custody for 30 days or
more without a judicial determination of probable cause. In reaching this
conclusion we attempted to reconcile important competing interests. On the one
hand, States have a strong interest in protecting public safety by taking into
custody those persons who are reasonably suspected of having engaged in criminal
activity, even where there has been no opportunity for a prior judicial
determination of probable cause. 420 U. S., at 112. On the other hand, prolonged
detention based on incorrect or unfounded suspicion may unjustly "imperil [a]
suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family
relationships." Id., at 114. We sought to balance these competing concerns by
holding that States "must provide a fair and reliable determination of probable
cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this
determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after
arrest." Id., at 125 (emphasis added).
The Court thus established a "practical compromise" between the rights of
individuals and the realities of law enforcement. Id., at 113. Under Gerstein,
warrantless arrests are permitted but persons arrested without a warrant must
promptly be brought before a neutral magistrate for a judicial determination of
probable cause. Id., at 114. Significantly, the Court stopped short of holding
that jurisdictions were constitutionally compelled to provide a probable cause
hearing immediately upon taking a suspect into custody and completing booking
procedures. We acknowledged the burden that proliferation of pretrial
proceedings places on the criminal justice system and recognized that the
interests of everyone involved, including those persons who are arrested, might
be disserved by introducing further procedural complexity into an already
intricate system. Id., at 119-123. Accordingly, we left it to the individual
States to integrate prompt probable cause determinations into their differing
systems of pretrial procedures. Id., at 123-124.
In so doing, we gave proper deference to the demands of federalism. We
recognized that "state systems of criminal procedure vary widely" in the nature
and number of pretrial procedures they provide, and we noted that there is no
single "preferred" approach. Id., at 123. We explained further that "flexibility
and experimentation by the States" with respect to integrating probable cause
determinations was desirable and that each State should settle upon an approach
"to accord with the State's pretrial procedure viewed as a whole." Ibid. Our
purpose in Gerstein was to make clear that the Fourth Amendment requires every
State to provide prompt determinations of probable cause, but that the
Constitution does not impose on the States a rigid procedural framework. Rather,
individual States may choose to comply in different ways.
Inherent in Gerstein's invitation to the States to experiment and adapt was the
recognition that the Fourth Amendment does not compel an immediate determination
of probable cause upon completing the administrative steps incident to arrest.
Plainly, if a probable cause hearing is constitutionally compelled the moment a
suspect is finished being "booked," there is no room whatsoever for "flexibility
and experimentation by the States." Ibid. Incorporating probable cause
determinations "into the procedure for setting bail or fixing other conditions
of pretrial release" -- which Ger stein explicitly contemplated, id., at 124 --
would be impossible. Waiting even a few hours so that a bail hearing or
arraignment could take place at the same time as the probable cause
determination would amount to a constitutional violation. Clearly, Gerstein is
not that inflexible.
Notwithstanding Gerstein's discussion of flexibility, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that no flexibility was permitted. It construed Gerstein as
"requiring a probable cause determination to be made as soon as the
administrative steps incident to arrest were completed, and that such steps
should require only a brief period." 888 F. 2d, at 1278 (emphasis added). This
same reading is advanced by the dissent. See post, at 3-4, 6. The foregoing
discussion readily demonstrates the error of this approach. Gerstein held that
probable cause determinations must be prompt -- not immediate. The Court
explained that "flexibility and experimentation" were "desirable"; that "there
is no single preferred pretrial procedure"; and that "the nature of the probable
cause determination usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial
procedure viewed as a whole." 420 U. S., at 123. The Court of Appeals and the
dissent disregard these statements, relying instead on selective quotations from
the Court's opinion. As we have explained, Gerstein struck a balance between
competing interests; a proper understanding of the decision is possible only if
one takes into account both sides of the equation.
The dissent claims to find support for its approach in the common law. It points
to several statements from the early 1800's to the effect that an arresting
officer must bring a per- son arrested without a warrant before a judicial
officer " `as soon as he reasonably can.' " Post, at 2 (emphasis in original).
This vague admonition offers no more support for the dissent's inflexible
standard than does Gerstein's statement that a hearing follow "promptly after
arrest." 420 U. S., at 125. As mentioned at the outset, the question before us
today is what is "prompt" under Gerstein. We answer that question by recognizing
that Gerstein struck a balance between competing interests.
B. Given that Gerstein permits jurisdictions to incorporate probable cause
determinations into other pretrial procedures, some delays are inevitable. For
example, where, as in Riverside County, the probable cause determination is
combined with arraignment, there will be delays caused by paperwork and
logistical problems. Records will have to be reviewed, charging documents
drafted, appearance of counsel arranged, and appropriate bail determined. On
weekends, when the number of arrests is often higher and available resources
tend to be limited, arraignments may get pushed back even further. In our view,
the Fourth Amendment permits a reasonable postponement of a probable cause
determination while the police cope with the everyday problems of processing
suspects through an overly burdened criminal justice system.
But flexibility has its limits; Gerstein is not a blank check. A State has no
legitimate interest in detaining for extended periods individuals who have been
arrested without probable cause. The Court recognized in Gerstein that a person
arrested without a warrant is entitled to a fair and reliable determination of
probable cause and that this determination must be made promptly.
Unfortunately, as lower court decisions applying Gerstein have demonstrated, it
is not enough to say that probable cause determinations must be "prompt." This
vague standard simply has not provided sufficient guidance. Instead, it has led
to a flurry of systemic challenges to city and county practices, putting federal
judges in the role of making legislative judgments and overseeing local
jailhouse operations. See, e. g., McGregor v. County of San Bernardino, decided
with McLaughlin v. County of Riverside, 888 F. 2d 1276 (CA9 1989); Scott v.
Gates, Civ. No. 84-8647 (CD Cal. Oct. 3, 1988); see also Bernard v. Palo Alto,
699 F. 2d 1023 (CA9 1983); Sanders v. Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694 (SD Tex. 1982),
affirmance order, 741 F. 2d 1379 (CA5 1984); Lively v. Cul linane, 451 F. Supp.
1000 (DC 1978).
Our task in this case is to articulate more clearly the boundaries of what is
permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Although we hesitate to announce that
the Constitution compels a specific time limit, it is important to provide some
degree of certainty so that States and counties may establish procedures with
confidence that they fall within constitutional bounds. Taking into account the
competing interests articulated in Gerstein, we believe that a jurisdiction that
provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest
will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.
For this reason, such jurisdictions will be immune from systemic challenges.
This is not to say that the probable cause determination in a particular case
passes constitutional muster simply because it is provided within 48 hours. Such
a hearing may nonetheless violate Gerstein if the arrested individual can prove
that his or her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably. Examples
of unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of gathering additional
evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the
arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake. In evaluating whether the delay
in a particular case is unreasonable, however, courts must allow a substantial
degree of flexibility. Courts cannot ignore the often unavoidable delays in
transporting arrested persons from one facility to another, handling late-night
bookings where no magistrate is readily available, obtaining the presence of an
arresting officer who may be busy processing other suspects or securing the
premises of an arrest, and other practical realities.
Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination
within 48 hours, the calculus changes. In such a case, the arrested individual
does not bear the bur- den of proving an unreasonable delay. Rather, the burden
shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency
or other extraordinary circumstance. The fact that in a particular case it may
take longer than 48 hours to consolidate pretrial proceedings does not qualify
as an extraordinary circumstance. Nor, for that matter, do intervening weekends.
A jurisdiction that chooses to offer combined proceedings must do so as soon as
is reasonably feasible, but in no event later than 48 hours after arrest.
The dissent urges that 24 hours is a more appropriate outer boundary for
providing probable cause determinations. See post, at 9. In arguing that any
delay in probable cause hearings beyond completing the administrative steps
incident to arrest and arranging for a magistrate is unconstitutional, the
dissent, in effect, adopts the view of the Court of Appeals. Yet the dissent
ignores entirely the Court of Appeals' determination of the time required to
complete those procedures. That court, better situated than this one, concluded
that it takes 36 hours to process arrested persons in Riverside County. 888 F.
2d, at 1278. In advocating a 24-hour rule, the dissent would compel Riverside
County -- and countless others across the Nation -- to speed up its criminal
justice mechanisms substantially, presumably by allotting local tax dollars to
hire additional police officers and magistrates. There may be times when the
Constitution compels such direct interference with local control, but this is
not one. As we have explained, Gerstein clearly contemplated a reasonable
accommodation between legitimate competing concerns. We do no more than
recognize that such accommodation can take place without running afoul of the
Fourth Amendment. Everyone agrees that the police should make every attempt to
minimize the time a presumptively innocent individual spends in jail. One way to
do so is to provide a judicial determination of probable cause immediately upon
completing the administrative steps incident to arrest -- i. e., as soon as the
suspect has been booked, photographed, and fingerprinted. As the dissent
explains, several States, laudably, have adopted this approach. The Constitution
does not compel so rigid a schedule, however. Under Gerstein, jurisdictions may
choose to combine probable cause determinations with other pretrial proceedings,
so long as they do so promptly. This necessarily means that only certain
proceedings are candidates for combination. Only those proceedings that arise
very early in the pretrial process -- such as bail hearings and arraignments --
may be chosen. Even then, every effort must be made to expedite the combined
proceedings. See 420 U. S., at 124.
IV. For the reasons we have articulated, we conclude that Riverside County is
entitled to combine probable cause determinations with arraignments. The record
indicates, however, that the County's current policy and practice do not comport
fully with the principles we have outlined. The County's current policy is to
offer combined proceedings within two days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, or
holidays. As a result, persons arrested on Thursdays may have to wait until the
following Monday before they receive a probable cause determination. The delay
is even longer if there is an intervening holiday. Thus, the County's regular
practice exceeds the 48-hour period we deem constitutionally permissible,
meaning that the County is not immune from systemic challenges, such as this
class action.
As to arrests that occur early in the week, the County's practice is that
"arraignments usually take place on the last day" possible. (1 App. 82). There
may well be legitimate reasons for this practice; alternatively, this may
constitute delay for delay's sake. We leave it to the Court of Appeals and the
District Court, on remand, to make this determination.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.