Public Opinion


I. Introduction: The Vietnam War and the Public

The Vietnam war illustrates several important points about public opinion. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, for example, shows how government officials can sometimes lead or manipulate opinion, especially when it concerns obscure matters in faraway lands.

The Johnson administration told the American public that American warships had been attacked twice by North Vietnamese
PT boats while on routine patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin. In reality, the attacks were not unprovoked as the Administration claimed (the U.S. ship that had been fired on had just helped South Vietnamese raid a North Vietnamese island) and the second attack never even occurred (it had been imagined by an inexperienced sonar man).

This incident allowed President Johnson to push the Tonkin Gulf Resolution through the Congress. This resolution approved the President's taking "all necessary measures" to repel any armed attack and to assist any ally in the region.

The Vietnam story also shows how events and circumstances as well as reports in the media affect public opinion. The public attitude about the situation in Vietnam as it first unfolded can be described as a "permissive consensus". The American people knew and cared little about the guerilla war and were willing to go along when their leaders told them that action was essential in order to resist communist aggression.

As the war escalated, public support for the war increased and only small minorities of the public were favored pulling American troops out of the region. As the war dragged on, however, public support for its continuation began to falter.
The large number of U.S. casualties and the many television reports about large numbers of dead servicemen began to
reduce support for the war in America.

This downward spiral in public support for the war momentarily reversed direction following the Tet Offensive in which the North Vietnamese launched massive attacks against South Vietnamese targets. Support continued to decline after this incident, however, as politicians, newspaper editorials, television commentators, and others criticized the war.

Finally, the Vietnam story also demonstrates that public opinion, even on foreign policy matters, can have a strong impact on policymaking. The growing dissatisfaction with the conflict (in March 1986 only 41 percent of Americans described themselves as hawks) was a major factor in President Johnson announcing that he would limit the bombing of North Vietnam, seek a negotiated settlement, and withdraw as a candidate for reelection.

Nixon's election to office and subsequent de-escalation of the war were also reflections of the antiwar sentiment among the American people. This chapter explores the nature, sources, and effects of public opinion, and its relation to ideas about democracy.


II. Democratic Theory and Public Opinion

Public opinion is defined as the political attitudes and beliefs expressed by ordinary citizens. In a perfect democracy, based on popular sovereignty and majority rule, the government would do exactly what its the people wanted. One important test of how well democracy is working, then, is how closely government policy corresponds to the expressed wishes of its citizens.

Nonetheless, many leading thinkers, including some who say that they believe in democracy, have expressed grave doubts about the quality and stability of public opinion. Some even have doubts about whether it exists. The Founders designed
the Constitution specifically to check the public through such devices as an appointed judiciary and the indirect election of senators and the President.

Alexis de Tocqueville warned about the dangers of the "tyranny of the majority", Walter Lippmann declared that most people do not know what goes on in the world, and Philip Converse found through survey research that many or most Americans seem to have no real views at all on many issues of public policy.

If such findings are correct, it hardly seems desirable, or even possible, that public opinion could determine what government does. Both the feasibility and the attractiveness of democracy seem to be thrown into doubt. When we examine just what sorts of opinions ordinary Americans have, however, and how those opinions are formed and changed, we will see that these fears and indictments of public opinion are very much exaggerated.


III. What People Know About Politics

Opinion polls and surveys take the guesswork out of studying public opinion. By taking a random sample of people who are
representative of the whole population, researchers are able to understand more about public opinion than ever before.
With a random sample of only about 1,000 or 1,500 people, social scientists can find out a great deal about the entire nation.

The many hundreds of polls and surveys of the last five or six decades provide a great deal of information about public opinion. One point the surveys consistently demonstrate is that most Americans do not know or care a lot about politics. This lack of knowledge does not just represent stupidity or laziness. There are good reasons for it.

Because most people are busy with their jobs and families, they simply don't have much time or energy left for politics. Unless following politics gives them pleasure, there is little reason for most Americans to invest much effort in it. Moreover, rational choice scholars remind us that a single citizen has only a minuscule chance of determining the outcome of an election in which thousands or millions of people vote. From a purely selfish point of view, then, it is not worth a lot of trouble to decide how to vote. The real surprise about public opinion may be that people know as much as they do.

Because we don't expect Americans to know a great deal about political issues, we would therefore not expect them to have 
an elaborately worked out ideology. Most people's attitudes do not hang together in a coherent structure. Americans have
opinions that vary from one issue to another--some conservative and some liberal. In-depth interviews indicate that these opinions are often linked by underlying themes and values, but not in the neat ways that leading ideologies would indicate. Such issue positions for individuals are also rather unstable over time.

Nevertheless, public opinion as a whole is neither unreal, unstable, nor irrelevant. The collective whole is greater than its individual parts. Even if there is some randomness in individuals' expressions of political opinions, the responses of thousands or millions of people tend to average out the randomness and reveal a stable collective public opinion.

Americans' collective policy preferences (as opposed to individual policy positions) are actually very stable over time. Even if most people have only a limited set of basic values and form many of their opinions by deferring to those they trust (party leaders, television commentators, etc.) the resulting public opinion need not be ignorant or unwise because trusted leaders may themselves take account of the best available information.

Some recent research has indicated that Americans' collective policy preferences react rather sensibly to events, changing
circumstances, and new information. The evidence seems to be clear that the American public as a whole has real opinions,
not just "non-attitudes" and that the Founders' fears of apriciousness and fluctuations in public opinion are no longer justified, if they ever were.


IV. Political Attitudes

More fundamental than opinions about specific policies are American's basic beliefs and values. Often there is a high degree of consensus about such matters. This is especially true of certain values involving freedom, democracy, capitalism, and equal opportunity.

Many observers have noted that there is no value in the American ethos more revered than freedom. A number of surveys over the years have documented wide support for freedom and liberty, at least in the abstract. This high regard for such values often falls apart, however, when it comes to specific cases of extreme or threatening minorities. For example, many Americans are willing to sacrifice certain people's liberty for the sake of morality and order, though they do not want government interfering with their own speech or beliefs.

The public is generally enthusiastic about economic liberty as well. Private ownership of property, for example, is strongly supported. There is similarly an overwhelming rejection of communism or socialism.

The word capitalism is not particularly popular in the United States but the substance of it--free markets and private ownership of the means of production--has strong support. Surveys have found that large majorities agree that the "free
enterprise system is necessary for free government." Large majorities also agree that the current economic system of
government is "just and wise".

Americans favor equality of opportunity, but they are not much interested in equality of result. There is not much public support for substantial redistribution of wealth or income, especially as compared with the attitudes of citizens in other advanced industrial countries. Most Americans tend to think that people generally should be left to get ahead on their own, so long as they have a fair start.

This does not mean that people want unrestrained private enterprise, however. For one thing, there is overwhelming sentiment in favor of equality of opportunity. Most Americans think that everyone should have an equal chance to do well and that government should help make sure that they can. Moreover, most Americans believe in some sort of economic safety net for those who fall behind in the competitive race and cannot help themselves. For decades, most Americans have favored a whole series of government social welfare programs that depart from a pure free enterprise system, such as government aid for education, health care, and jobs.

The ideas of equal opportunity, regulation, and economic safety nets sometimes conflict with the ideals of economic liberty and capitalism. Some Americans (those who call themselves conservatives) emphasize economic liberty and freedom from government interference. Other Americans (known as liberals) stress equality of opportunity and the need for government regulation and safety nets.

This is one of the main sources of political disagreement in America. It makes up a big part of the difference between the ideologies of liberalism and conservatism. The terms "liberalism" and "conservatism" are also used to refer to positions on social and foreign policy issues. Many people are liberal in some ways but conservative in others. Moreover, the definitions of liberal and conservative seem to vary at different moments in American history.

The American public strongly believes in democracy. An overwhelming majority of citizens agree that people should have equal access to the government, that public officials should be chosen by majority vote, that everyone is entitled to the same legal rights and protection no matter what their political beliefs, and that people in the minority should be free to try to win majority support for their opinions. Such findings over the years point to rock solid support for majority rule and popular control of government.

Many of the policy preferences of Americans have remained stable over time. For example, Americans have given wide 
support for spending more money on law enforcement, education, Social Security, environmental programs, and government help with medical expenses. This support held strong even when the Reagan administration was cutting such programs. Most Americans want more of these programs, not less.

By contrast, there is little support for foreign aid (except for disaster relief), military aid, or arms sales abroad. Most Americans would prefer to shift financial resources from the military to domestic programs. On most issues of foreign policy, American public opinion is quite stable as well. 

The policy preferences of Americans on many social issues, however, have undergone a great deal of change. On the abortion issue, for example, support for abortion rose markedly between 1965 and the early 1970s. Nearly all of the change over the abortion issue occurred before the Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade decision in January 1973, which declared that the Constitution protects a woman's right to have an abortion. Changing public attitudes may have affected the Court's decision but such attitudes did not result from it.

Other liberalizing trends have also occurred in the area of civil right and civil liberties. Beginning in the 1940s and 1950s and continuing through the 1980s and 1990s, Americans have increasingly favored integrated schools, housing, work, and public accommodations. Americans have increasingly favored letting dissident groups (Communists, Socialists, atheists, etc.) teach school, speak in public, and have their books in libraries.

Most Americans are loyal to a political party. This sense of belonging to a party is called party identification. Most people begin to identify with a party when they are young (usually adopting the same party as their parents), and most tend to stick with that party through the rest of their lives. They use the party label to help organize their thinking about politics, to guide them in voting, and to judge new policy proposals.

Since the highly popular New Deal of the 1930s, more Americans have identified themselves as Democrats than as Republicans. Although the Democrats have been the majority party, their advantage has declined substantially since the 
1970s.

During the same period, there was a marked decline in the number of people identifying with either political party. The number of people calling themselves independents has increased from about 23 percent of the population to about 35 percent since the 1970s.

Although the reasons for this decline are not completely clear, they seem to be related to the disappointments of the Vietnam War, urban unrest, Watergate, and the economic hard times of the 1970s. Moreover, surveys show that Americans have a growing sense that differences between the parties are no longer clear or important.

Another important aspect of public opinion involves citizens' judgments of how the government is doing. Pollsters regularly ask people whether they approve or disapprove of the President's handling of the job. This crucial measure of presidential popularity is seen as a good indicator of support for the government's performance because it tends to fluctuate much more than party loyalties or policy preferences.

Popularity is a good predictor of whether the President will win reelection and whether the President's party will win or
lose congressional seats. Popularity also affects how much influence the President has in Congress and how effectively
the President can persuade the public to agree with administration policy stands. A president who is very popular with the public can be a political powerhouse while an unpopular President is often ineffectual.

Presidential popularity is determined to a great extent by economic factors and international crises. Popularity tends
to be low when economic factors are bad, but international crises can lead the public to "rally 'round the flag" and
support the President. Similarly, citizens' sense of political efficacy--their feelings about whether government pays any attention to ordinary people, whether voting does any good, and so forth--has varied somewhat, depending on how things are going.

Where do all of these political attitudes and opinions come from? Political learning, sometimes called political socialization, begins when people are very young. Their families and schools play key parts as agents of socialization. However, people continue to form and to change their political attitudes and beliefs throughout their lives, as they are exposed to new experiences and political events.

Children get their first ideas about politics from their parents and siblings. Most children (though not all) adopt their parents' party identification and keep it the rest of their lives. A recent study found that 59 percent of young people identified with the same party as their parents. People also inherit ethnicity, religion, and a set of values, beliefs, and practices from their parents. As people's circumstances change, however, they may change party loyalties as well as political values and beliefs.

When children go to school, they are exposed both to classroom teaching and to interaction with other students. From their peers, students learn about the differences between those who are "Democrats" and those who are "Republicans." By going home and asking their parents why their friends belong to a different party, they stimulate political discussion and learn more about what the parties stand for.

In later grades and in high schools, political lessons become more explicit. Social studies, history, and civics classes deal with the structure of the U.S. government, often explicitly arguing the virtues of liberty, democracy, and equal opportunity. By the time they reach their twenties, most Americans have a reasonably well-formed set of basic values, a sense of belonging to a political party, some policy preferences, and some evaluations of government performance.

When young adults go to work for the first time, economic realities suddenly become more pressing. Government policies about taxes, unemployment insurance, and pensions begin to have a personal impact. Some people adjust their party
loyalties or even their world views and ideologies. For example, the unemployed become less enthusiastic about the American dream.

The organization of the work place also may change a person's political views. Assembly line workers, used to taking orders, tend not to participate actively in politics unless a strong labor union mobilizes them. As people establish homes and families, they begin to worry about property taxes, schools for their children, protection against crime, and efficient garbage collection. They tend to get more involved in politics.

What happens in the political world often changes people's attitudes and beliefs. This is especially true for the young, who tend to solidify their policy preferences and party loyalties in response to the historical moment at which they come of age. But this may also be true of adults as well. For example, people change their evaluations of Presidents quickly when surprisingly good or bad things happen. Party loyalties, once thought to be virtually immune to change, now are known to adjust to the parties'
performances in war and peace and to the management of the economy.

The various agents of socialization or sources of political learning affect different people in different ways. Although there are group differences, millions of Americans tend to learn many of the same ideas and attitudes. These common ideas and beliefs are based on a common history, shared experiences, and particular characteristics of the American economy, culture, and society.

These characteristics, which we have referred to as structural, have profound effects on American public opinion and make it different from public opinion in other countries. For example, America's deep commitment to democracy undoubtedly stems from 200 years of a generally successful experience with democratic institutions.

Similarly, the public's enthusiasm for political and economic liberty, and the people's embrace of private property and a free enterprise system have a lot to do with the U.S. economy's success at producing abundant goods. The economic and social structures that have shaped America's basic values of democracy, liberty, and equality have also affected many of our policy preferences, such as the public's general reluctance to have government interfere too deeply with the economy and the desire for social welfare policies to soften the impact of the market. Structural changes, therefore, bring about changes in policy preferences.


V. How People Differ

In describing American public opinion as a whole, it is important to recognize important distinctions among different sorts of people in varying circumstances. Different groups of people tend to differ in their political attitudes. 

Among the biggest political differences are those between white and black Americans. Blacks are the most solidly Democratic of any group in the population. Black American also tend to be much more liberal than whites on economic issues, especially those involving aid to minorities or help with jobs, housing, medical care, education, and the like. This distinction reflects blacks' economically disadvantaged position in American society and the lingering effects of slavery and discrimination.

In 1988, twice as many blacks located their political views on the liberal side of a seven-point scale as placed themselves on the conservative side. On this same scale, whites were about equally split between conservatives and liberals. On some social issues, however, blacks tend to be relatively conservative, reflecting strong religious values.

Other ethnic groups such as Irish-Americans and people of Italian and Polish descent are no longer as distinctive as blacks in their political predispositions. Although Hispanics make up the fastest-growing ethnic group in  merica, they do not form a very large voting block. Hispanics constitute several quite different groups (Cuban- Americans, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, etc.) and are one of the least politically active groups in the United States. Low incomes, suspicion of authorities, and lack of facility with the English language discourage participation. Consequently, the Hispanic community is a sleeping giant in American
politics. 

Ethnic differences are often interwoven with differences in  religious faith and values, which have their own special importance. Roman Catholics, who constitute about 27 percent of the population, were heavily Democratic after the New Deal
but now resemble other Americans in their party affiliations. Catholics' economic liberalism has faded somewhat with the
rise in their incomes but remains substantial.

American Jews (only about 2 percent of the U.S. population) began to join the Democratic party in the 1920s and have generally remained loyal to the party. Jews are exceptionally liberal on social issues, such as civil liberties and abortion.

The four million or so members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, or Mormons, are distinguished by being
the most staunchly conservative and most solidly Republican of any major religious denomination.

The large Protestant majority of Americans, of course, does not differ much from the U.S. average in most respects. In
the early 1980s, evangelical Christians played an important part in the new right segment of Ronald Reagan's conservative
coalition, pushing hard for their positions against abortion, against pornography, for law and order, and for their version
of family values.

Although political differences based on region are not as prominent as they once were, the South continues to differ from the rest of the nation in certain respects. Even now, white southerners tend to be somewhat less enthusiastic about civil rights than northerners; only people from the Mountain West are nearly as conservative on racial issues. Southerners also tend to be conservative on social issues, such as school prayer, crime, women's rights, and abortion, and supportive of military spending and an assertive foreign policy.

These distinctive policy preferences have gradually undercut southern whites' traditionally strong identification with the Democratic Party, especially since the 1960s and 1970s, when the national Democrats became identified with liberal social
policies and an anti-war foreign policy. As for other regional differences, Northeasterners tend to be the most different from southerners, with mid-westerners in the middle. Pacific Coast residents resemble Northeasterners in many respects, but people from the mountain states tend to be quite conservative.

Regardless of region, urban, rural, and suburban residents tend to differ from each other in understandable ways. City dwellers are concerned mostly about inner-city problems such as poverty and unemployment, while suburbanites are less
eager to spend money on inner-city concerns. Country dwellers tend, on average, to be conservative, both economically and socially; to favor military strength; and to support law and order and conventional morality, while opposing stringent gun controls.

Compared with much of the world, the United States has had rather little political conflict among people of different incomes or occupational groupings. In fact, few American think of themselves as members of any class at all, except, perhaps, middle class. Although class consciousness is not present, there are still major differences in terms of political behavior of people within different income groups.

Since the time of the New Deal, substantially more low-income people, as well as blue-collar workers and union members,
have identified themselves as Democrats rather than Republicans. The exact opposite is true at the top of the income and occupational scales. There are also differences between income groups on policy preferences. Lower income groups are more inclined to favor government help with jobs, education, housing, medical care, and the like, whereas the higher-income people, who would presumably pay more and benefit less from such programs, tend to oppose them.

Education is related to income. Education helps people earn more and allows them to give their children better schooling.
But education has some distinct political effects of its own. Educations is the strongest single predictor of participation in politics. College-educated people are much more likely to vote, talk about politics, go to meetings, sign petitions, and write letters than are people who have attained only elementary or high school educations.

Individuals with more schooling also have some distinctive policy preferences. They are especially protective of civil rights, civil liberties, and individual freedom. Education may contribute to tolerance by exposing people to diverse ideas or by training them in elite-backed norms of tolerance. Educated people tend to be more aware of news and commentary in the media, and are therefore more likely to change their opinions than others.

Women and men are not so different politically as one might expect. They belong to the Republican and Democratic parties
in nearly the same proportions (women being slightly more Democratic) and differ only moderately on certain kinds of issues. For many years, women voted and participated at lower rates than men, but this participation gap has been closed. There is still, however, a gap in office-holding, with women holding proportionately fewer offices than men.

On policy matters, women differ somewhat from men in that they are more likely to be more opposed to violence, whether by criminals or by the state. Contrary to common impressions, women have not been particularly more supportiv than men of women's rights or abortion rights.

Although young and the old differ on certain matters that touch their particular interests, the chief difference between generations is that young people are more attuned to the particular times in which they grow up. Those who were young during the 1960s were especially quick to favor civil rights for blacks, for example. During the 1980s and 1990s, young people have been especially concerned about environmental issues. Social change occurs by generational replacement when old ideas die off with old people.


VI. Public Opinion and Policy

One crucial test of democracy is how closely a government's policies correspond to the expressed wishes of its citizens. How close, then, is the relationship in the United States between what the citizens want and what the government does? As the example of the Vietnam War suggested, at least under some circumstances, public opinion does affect policymaking.

One striking example of government responsiveness to the public involves the federal budget in 1991. In the fall of 1990, after months of secret summit negotiations and hardball pressure, the Bush administration and leading congressional Democrats agreed on a plan that would reduce the budget deficit by raising taxes on gasoline and heating oil, aviation, alcohol, and cigarettes, and by raising certain Social Security and Medicare taxes.

Polls indicated that the proposal was unpopular and President Bush's popular support dropped sharply. Congress heard the
public outcry and representatives from both parties abandoned the plan. After intense bargaining they agreed on a new
budget that would cut the deficit just as much but would shift more of the burden more to higher-income people.

Although public opinion usually has a less dramatic impact on policymaking than the above example shows, when we look at
many different policy issues--foreign and domestic--we find that U.S. government policy corresponded with what opinion
surveys said the public wanted about two-thirds of the time. In fact, in cases in which public opinion changed by a substantial and an enduring amount and the issue was prominent, government policy moved in the same direction 87 percent of the time.

On the state level, studies show that policies enacted in particular states correspond closely to the opinions of the states' citizens. That is, states with more liberal citizens tend to have more liberal policies, whereas states with more  conservative citizens have more conservative policies. Public opinion, therefore, seems to have a significant influence on government policy. Changes in opinion really do bring about changes in policy.