1 Case Briefs 2/10

 

MARBURY V. MADISON

 

Dustin Gunnells

American Constitutional Law

Marbury v. Madison

2/10/09

            The Marbury v. Madison case is from the 1800 election when Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams and became the third President of the United States of America. This doesn’t seem like a big deal but from the time of the election until Jefferson took office Adams passed the Judiciary Act of 1801. This act pretty much added ten new district courts. This Act also gave the President the right to appoint Federal judges and justices of the peace.

            Adams appointed William Marbury as the Federal justice of the peace, but his commission was not delivered. Marbury petitioned to the Supreme Court to the Secretary of State, which was a man by the name of James Madison. John Marshall at the time was the Chief of Justice denied Marbury’s petitions. He stated that the petition was holding that the statute upon which he based his claim, the Judiciary Act of 1801, was unconstitutional.

            With this all being said this is what came out of the case. This was the first time at that time which remember was 1800 that the Supreme Court ruled something unconstitutional. This court case brought about a lot of things. First it brought about the Judicial Review in the U.S. What this meant was that the courts could oversee and nullify the actions of another branch of government. Also it brought about the decision to carve out the “checks and balances” system.

            The out come of this case was that on the 24th of February in 1803 the court rendered a unanimous 4 to 0 decision. The reason being was that Marbury had the right to his commission but the court did not have the power to force Madison to deliver the commission. Reactions to this decision, one new President Thomas Jefferson disagreed with Marshall’s reasoning in the case. Saying that if this view of Judicial Power became accepted, it would be placing us under an oligarchy or a government of a small group running the country.

 

Greg Brown

                                                                    Date 02-01-2009

Brief: Marbury vs. Madison

     Before President John Adams left office in 1801 he filled the newly created forty-two justice of the peace positions with members of his own Federalist Party.  One of the appointees was William Marbury.  Marbury’s commission had been confirmed by the Senate, signed by Adams and sealed by Chief Justice John Marshall, who was also serving as Adam’s Secretary of State.  Marbury did not receive his commission before Adams was replaced by newly elected President Thomas Jefferson.  Jefferson’s Secretary of State James Madison refused to delivery the commission to Marbury.  Marbury asked the Supreme Court to force Madison to provide his commission arguing Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the court jurisdiction to decide the case.  Despite Chief Justice Marshall’s involvement in the Adams administration he not only participated in the ruling of this case but offered the courts decision.  

     The Supreme Court can hear cases three ways.  First by filing directly with the court, second file the case in a lower federal court and then through appeals process until you reach the Supreme Court.  Lastly, file the case in state court and then appeal all the way through the states court and then appeal the case on a federal issue.  Marbury believed the Judiciary Act gave the Supreme Court the authority to hear his case based on a writ of mandamus.  The court needed to decide if they agreed they had the right of original jurisdiction which was granted to the courts in the Judiciary Act. 

     In a 4-0 decision with Chief Justice Marshall writing the opinion for the court, the court denied Marbury’s request.  The court ruled that Marbury had a right to be recognized as a commissioner but the court did not have the right to enforce his selection.  Marshall and the court found Section 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitutional.  The section granted the court the right of original jurisdiction but Marshall and the other justices disagreed saying it was unconstitutional.  Therefore the court had no legal authority to issue the writ.  However, Marshall and the court did affirm the courts right of judicial review, meaning the court could rule on the legality of laws passed by government.  If in the opinion of the court the law passed violated the constitution, it could be ruled unconstitutional.

     President Jefferson disagreed with the ruling because he felt it would give the Supreme Court too much authority over the ability of the Congress to pass laws.  Congress duly elected by the people could be overruled in legal matters by judges who are seated for life.  Some legal scholars believed the court had the right to issue the writ because the court did have the right of original jurisdiction in cases involving public ministers.  They contend Madison fit that definition.  Some have argued that the court should not have expanded on the courts right of review.  Its ruling should have only dealt with the Marbury issue.  After deciding it had no authority to force the commission of Marbury the court should not have expanded its ruling on judicial review. There was also the argument that Marshall should have excused his self from ruling on the issue based on the fact that he was President Adams Secretary of State. Despite these dissenting opinions the legal community now recognizes the Supreme Courts right of judicial review,

 

SEVIN

            Marbury v. Madison (1803)

 

Facts of the Case: William Marbury had been commissioned justice of the peace in the District of Columbia by President John Adams in the “midnight appointments” at the very end of his administration. When the new administration did not deliver the commission, Marbury sued James Madison, Jefferson's Secretary of State.  Marbury vs. Madison formed the basis for the exercise of judicial review in the United States under Article III of the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison was the first time the Supreme Court declared something "unconstitutional," and established the concept of judicial review in the U.S. (the idea that courts may oversee and nullify the actions of another branch of government). The landmark decision helped define the "checks and balances" of the American form of government. The decision established the doctrine of judicial review, which recognizes the authority of courts to declare statutes unconstitutional.

The core Constitutional issues:

The Ruling of the Court:  The Court rendered a unanimous (4-0) decision, that Marbury had the right to his commission but the court did not have the power to force Madison to deliver the commission. Chief Justice John Marshall held that, although Marbury was entitled to the commission, the statute that was the basis of the particular remedy sought was unconstitutional because it gave the Supreme Court authority that was implicitly denied it by Article 3 of the U.S. Constitution.

 

The majority opinion:  The justices held, through Marshall's forceful argument, that on the last issue the Constitution was "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation" and that "an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void." In other words, when the Constitution (the nation's highest law) conflicts with an act of the legislature, that act is invalid. This case establishes the Supreme Court's power of judicial review. It is definitely the province and duty of the Judicial Department [the judicial branch] to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, explain and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each. So, if a law be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the Courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the Legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.Those, then, who controvert the principle that the Constitution is to be considered in court as a paramount law are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution, and see only the law.This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions.

 

 

 

 

Crystal Russell

Constitutional Law

February 10, 2009

Case Brief

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137

 

            The case began on March 2, 1801, when an obscure Federalist, William Marbury, was designated as a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. Marbury and several others were appointed to government posts created by Congress in the last days of John Adams’s presidency, by these last – minute appointments were never fully finalized. The disgruntled appointees invoked an act of Congress and sued for their jobs in the Supreme Court.

December term of 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper, by their counsel severally moved the court for a rule to James Madison of the state of the United States, to show cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding him to cause to be delivered to them respectively their several commissions as justices of the peace in the district of Columbia.

The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men, It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. The opinion of the court was that by signing the commission of Mr. Marbury, the president of the United States appointed him a justice of peace for the country of Washington in the district of Columbia; and that the seal of the United States affixed by the secetary of state, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment, and that the appointment conferred on him a legal right to the office of the space of five years. He has a consequent right to the commission a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is completely demonstrative of the legislative opinion on this subject. The justices held, through Marshall’s forceful argument, that on the last issue the Constitution was “the fundamental and paramount law of the nation” and that “an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.” When the Constitution – the nation’s highest law – conflicts with an act of the legislature, that act is invalid. This case establishes the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review.

 

Bridget Tognazzini

02-03-09

 

Marbury v. Madison (1803)

 

Facts of the case: William Marbury was nominated for a justice-of-peace post, confirmed by congress, signed by President John Adams, and sealed by John Marshall, the secretary of state. During the close of Adams presidency the commission was not delivered. James Madison, the new Secretary of State, refused to deliver the commission. Marbury bought a suit to the Supreme Court to get his commission.

 

Core constitutional issues:  The core constitutional issues were if Marbury was entitled to his commission, if he was entitled and Madison violated his rights to the commission if the laws of the country should make Madison give him his commission, and if the court did give him his commission if it was a mandamus under the Judiciary Act of 1789 section 13 "The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after provided for; and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts . . . and writs of mandamus . . . to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States." was constitutional and did they have original jurisdiction. U.S. Constitutional article III, Section 2 Clause 2 provides "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned [within the judicial power of the United States], the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."

 

Ruling of the Court: In a 4-0 decision the court answered that Marbury was entitled his commission, that Madison did deny him that right, but that the court did not have original jurisdiction so could not force him to give him his commission and the Judiciary Act of 1789 section 13 that states that they had original jurisdiction was unconstitutional. So in the end the court ruled that it could have judicial review and could find laws unconstitutional but Marbury lost.

 

Majority opinion: The majority opinion was that Marbury should have his commission but they could not force Madison. This case was 4-0 on this issue, which gave the court the rights of judicial review and power to make laws unconstitutional.

 

Tammy McCollum

 

 

February 3, 2009

 

 

 

Brief:  Marbury v. Madison

 

 

Beginning on March 2, 1801, William Marbury was appointed by President John Adams to one of forty-two justice-of-the-peace posts mandated for the District of Columbia.  This appointment, along with others, were done at the end of Adams’ presidential term and not actually finalized before Adams left office.  Therefore, when the new administration took office, they refused to honor these commissions.  Marbury then brought suit in the Supreme Court to compel delivery of his commission, relying on Sections 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which, he claimed, gave the supreme Court original jurisdiction in such a case. 

 

The questions before the Court are as follows: 

 

Has Marbury the right to the commission he demands?

If so, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?

If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus (order from a high court to a lower court)  issuing from the Supreme Court?

 

The Court held that, by signing the commission of Mr. Marbury, the President of the United Stantes appointed him a justice of peace, for the county of Washington in the district of Columbia; and that the seal of the U.S., affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature and completion of the appointment.  So, by having this legal title to the office, he has a right to the commission.  A refusal to deliver that commission is a plain violation of his right and therefore the laws of the country affords him a remedy. 

 

The only question that remains in this case is whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review it.  The Constitution vests the whole judicial power of the U.S. in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as Congress shall ordain and establish.  This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the U.S. and may be exercised over the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the U.S.  In the distribution of this power it is declared that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party.  In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.”

 

The justices held that the Constitution was “the fundamental and paramount law of the nation” and that “an act of the legislature repugnant ot the constitution is void.”  In other words, when the Constitution conflicts with an act of the legislature, that act is invalid.  This case establishes the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review.

 

 

            Marbury v. Madison (1803)

 

Facts of the Case: William Marbury had been commissioned justice of the peace in the District of Columbia by President John Adams in the “midnight appointments” at the very end of his administration. When the new administration did not deliver the commission, Marbury sued James Madison, Jefferson's Secretary of State.  Marbury vs. Madison formed the basis for the exercise of judicial review in the United States under Article III of the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison was the first time the Supreme Court declared something "unconstitutional," and established the concept of judicial review in the U.S. (the idea that courts may oversee and nullify the actions of another branch of government). The landmark decision helped define the "checks and balances" of the American form of government. The decision established the doctrine of judicial review, which recognizes the authority of courts to declare statutes unconstitutional.

The core Constitutional issues:

The Ruling of the Court:  The Court rendered a unanimous (4-0) decision, that Marbury had the right to his commission but the court did not have the power to force Madison to deliver the commission. Chief Justice John Marshall held that, although Marbury was entitled to the commission, the statute that was the basis of the particular remedy sought was unconstitutional because it gave the Supreme Court authority that was implicitly denied it by Article 3 of the U.S. Constitution.

 

The majority opinion:  The justices held, through Marshall's forceful argument, that on the last issue the Constitution was "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation" and that "an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void." In other words, when the Constitution (the nation's highest law) conflicts with an act of the legislature, that act is invalid. This case establishes the Supreme Court's power of judicial review. It is definitely the province and duty of the Judicial Department [the judicial branch] to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, explain and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each. So, if a law be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the Courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the Legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.Those, then, who controvert the principle that the Constitution is to be considered in court as a paramount law are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution, and see only the law.This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions.

 

CALDER V.  BULL
 

Katrina Simmons

 

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798), is a famous case in which the United States Supreme Court examined its authority to review state legislature decisions. The Connecticut legislature ordered a new trial in a court case about the contents of a will, overruling an earlier court ruling. In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the legislature's actions did not violate the ex post facto law in article 1, section 10 of the Constitution, which states:

 

“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.”

 

An ex post facto law or retroactive law, is a law that retroactively changes the legal consequences of acts committed or the legal status of facts and relationships that existed prior to the enactment of the law.

The holding in this case still remains good law: the ex post facto provision of the Constitution applies solely to criminal cases, not civil cases

In this case, the participating Supreme Court judges were: William Cushing, James Iredell, William Paterson and Samuel Chase.

Justice Samuel Chase argued that the government has no authority to interfere with an individual's rights, and "the general principles of law and reason" forbid the legislature from interfering.

Justice James Iredell stated that:

“the ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice.”

Iredell affirmed the ability of the Supreme Court to review the legislature by writing:

“If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void...If, on the other hand, the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice... “

There are then but two rights, in which the subject can be viewed: 1st. If the Legislature pursue the authority delegated to them, their acts are valid...they exercise the discretion vested in them by the people, to whom alone they are responsible for the faithful discharge of their trust... 2nd. If they transgress the boundaries of that authority, their acts are invalid...they violate a fundamental law, which must be our guide, whenever we are called upon as judges to determine the validity of a legislative act.

This clause prohibits the enactment of ex post facto laws.  An ex post facto law is a law that makes an action criminal after the fact, in other words punishing something when it was not illegal when it was done.  Under this clause, the change in legislation should have affected all appeals after the change.  It became an ex post facto law because it was applied to an appeal that occurred before the change in legislation.

 

Student Name: Amanda Hinshaw

Date: 02-03-09

Brief: Calder v. Bull

            The facts of the case revolve around a disputed will.  The parties involved in the case were Mr. Calder, Mr. Bull, and Mrs. Bull.  Mrs. and Mr. Bull were named the benefactors in Norman Morrison’s will.  After a probate court in the state of Connecticut denied Mrs. and Mr. Bull their inheritance, they began an appeal process to reverse the decision.  Their action was taken more than eighteen months after the Connecticut court denied their inheritance and as such was not accepted because of a Connecticut law prohibiting appeals that are attempted after eighteen months from the original decision.  Mrs. and Mr. Bull went to the state’s legislature and got the restriction changed.  They then appealed the original decision and won.  Mr. Calder had received the inheritance when the Bull’s were denied and appealed the reversed decision to the United States Supreme Court.

            The core constitutional issue in this case is the ex post facto clause.  This clause prohibits the enactment of ex post facto laws.  An ex post facto law is a law that makes an action criminal after the fact, in other words punishing something when it was not illegal when it was done.  Under this clause, the change in legislation should have affected all appeals after the change.  It became an ex post facto law because it was applied to an appeal that occurred before the change in legislation.

            The United States Supreme Court heard Mr. Calder’s appeal and decided against Mr. Calder.  The court ruled in favor of Mrs. and Mr. Bull stating that the Connecticut courts application of the changed legislation of Connecticut law to Mrs. and Mr. Bull’s appeal was not a violation of the United States Constitution’s ex post facto clause.

            The majority opinion in this case was that there was a difference between an individual’s private or personal rights and his or her criminal rights.  The majority of the court believed that the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution refers to criminal not personal contract rights.  Justice Chase pointed out that every ex post facto law is retrospective, but every retrospective law is not always ex post facto.  In this particular case the retrospective legislation is not ex post facto because it does not deal with criminal rights.  The importance of this case in relation to judicial power revolves around interpretation.  The court did not create new law or disregard old law.  Instead they clarified a term used in the Constitution.  It also relates to the self-imposed restriction of ruling on general law instead of constitutional issue.  The court did not rule based on whether the law was constitutional or not.  They ruled based on whether the issue was addressed by the ex post facto clause.  The majority opinion was that the ex post facto clause was to protect criminal not contract rights.

            Justice James Iredell provided a concurring opinion.  He argued that while Justice Chase claimed the ability of a state legislature to correct state laws was not the issue, that was in fact the issue the court must address.  Justice Iredell argued that if the state legislature was acting within the authority given to them, their laws would be valid.  However, if the state legislature went outside that authority those laws would be invalid.  In such cases, he argued, it is the courts unpleasant responsibility to declare such law invalid.




 

Joshua Kerr

2/10/2009

 

Brief: Calder vs. Bull

 

Mr. and Mrs. Caleb Bull were to gain an inheritance from the deceased Norman Morrison.  However, the couple waited over eighteen months to file their claim on the inheritance, which was outside of the eighteen month limit as mandated by Connecticut state law.  By this time, the inheritance had been awarded to Mr. Calder.  The Bull’s successfully lobbied the state legislature to change the eighteen month limit, but the inheritance had already been received by Mr. Calder, who clearly did not wish to part from it.  Following the change to the law, the Bull’s appealed and won the inheritance.  Calder then challenged this decision, which brought the case before the United States Supreme Court.

The key constitutional issue involved is whether or not ex post facto clause applied to the change in Connecticut’s eighteen month limit on appeals.  Article 1, section 10 states that no state shall pass any ex post facto law, meaning that no law shall be passed making something illegal or not after the act has been done.  In this case, was the change by the Connecticut legislature legal, or was it ex post facto.

The court ruled in favor of the Bull’s in this case.  It stated that the change in the law limiting appeals to an eighteen month time period was not an ex post facto law.  The court based this decision on the fact that the ex post facto clause applies only to criminal cases, and not cases of civil litigation.

The majority opinion in this case was written by Justice Samuel Chase.  In his opinion, Chase first writes about the limits that should be placed on the power legislatures; particularly state legislatures.  He states that a law that punishes a person for an action that was not illegal at the time, a law that tinkers with existing private contracts, a law that makes a person his own judge, or a law that takes property from one and gives it to another is are all out of bounds for a legislature.  He also clearly states that this was not a case to determine whether a state’s legislature can overturn the decisions of its courts as the revision of the eighteen month statute in question may have done.  ‘

Though Justice James Iredell agreed with the outcome of the case, he had a different perspective then did Justice Chase.  He was very wary of legislative power over the judiciary.  He makes a very clear and strong case that the power of the any legislature is limited to those given to it by the constitutions it is subject to, and any act beyond those limits is void.  Likewise he states that any statute passed within constitutional framework cannot be void. 


 

Anna Bavido

Constitutional Law

Dr. Rutledge

February 9th, 2009

Calder V. Bull Case Brief

This case started as a dispute over a willed inheritance.  I was unable to find out what exactly the argument over the inheritance.  Suffice to say that the will named Mr. and Mrs. Calder as the benefactors, but a Connecticut probate court gave the inheritance to a Mr. Bull.  Mr. and Mrs. Calder appealed this decision eighteen months after it had been so ruled.  According to Connecticut law at that time, this was too long after the original decision to appeal.  Mr. and Mrs. Calder went to the Connecticut state legislator and had this rule changed.  I would love to hear how they managed that, but, once again, no information was available.  With their new law in  hand the Calders went back to court and got their inheritance.  Mr. Bull then appealed this decision, arguing that the decision violated the Constitution’s ex post facto clause.

In Article One, Section Nine of the U.S. Constitution it states that “No bill of attainder, or ex post facto law shall be passed.”  Does the ex post facto clause apply to criminal cases?  Yes.  Does the ex post facto clause apply to civil cases?  No.  Did the Connecticut court’s ruling violate this clause because the decision was based on a law passed after the case had started?  No, because it is a civil case and the clause applies only to criminal cases.

The Supreme Court ruled in 1798 that Mr. Bull’s Constitutional rights had not been violated because his case was a civil one to which the ex post facto clause did not apply.  Justice Samuel Chase wrote the majority opinion stating the above argument.  There were no dissenting opinions.




BAKER V. CARR

SEVIN

 

Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962)

 Facts of the Case

Charles W. Baker and other Tennessee citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to apportion the seats for the state's General Assembly was virtually ignored. Baker's suit detailed how Tennessee's reapportionment efforts ignored significant economic growth and population shifts within the state.  His complaint was that though the Tennessee State Constitution required that legislative districts be redrawn every ten years according to the federal census, to provide for districts of substantially equal population, Tennessee had not in fact redistricted since the census of 1901.

 

Issues 

Civil Rights, Reapportionment

 

Question

Did the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over questions of legislative apportionment?

 

Ruling

The reapportionment of state legislative districts is not a political question, and is justifiable by the federal courts.  In an opinion which explored the nature of "political questions" and the appropriateness of Court action in them, the Court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that legislative apportionment was a justiciable issue. In his opinion, Justice Brennan provided past examples in which the Court had intervened to correct constitutional violations in matters pertaining to state administration and the officers through whom state affairs are conducted. Brennan concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection issues which Baker and others raised in this case merited judicial evaluation.

 

Concurring Opinion

   Justice Tom. C. Clark switched his vote at the last minute to a concurrence on                the substance of Baker’s claims, which would have enabled a majority which could have granted relief for Baker, but instead the Supreme Court remanded the case to the District Court.

    Dissenting Opinion

   Frankfurter, joined by John Marshall Harlan II, dissented vigorously and at      length, arguing that the Court had shunted aside history and judicial restraint and violated the separation of powers between legislatures and Courts.