Student Name: Amanda Hinshaw
Date: 4-14-09
Brief: Kelo v. City of New London
The facts of this case revolve around a property seizure by New London, Connecticut. The town used its eminent domain power to confiscate private property in order to sell that property to a private developer. The New London government stated that developing the seized lands could create new jobs as well as new tax revenues. The owners of the confiscated property, Susette Kelo being one of them, brought suit in the state court of New London claiming the seizure was in violation of the takings clause in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The clause stated that no private property could be seized by the government for public utilization without the government compensating the owner or owners. Kelo claimed that the property was not being used for the public because it was being sold to private developers. The Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled in favor of the city of New London.
The core constitutional issue in this case revolved around the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. The city had hoped that by seizing the private property and selling it to a private company for development, the increase in tax revenues and jobs would boost New London’s weakened economy. The question facing the justices of the United States Supreme Court was whether or not the city of New London’s seizing of private property and then selling it to a private developer was a violation of the United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment takings clause.
The holding of the Supreme Court was in favor of the city of New London. The Court ruled that the seizure of private land sold to private developers, though the land itself was not actually to be used by the public, met the public use meaning in the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause. It met the meaning because the economic development would benefit the entire public of New London not a particular group or particular individual. The ruling stated that the clause’s wording of public use was not intended to be taken literally. Instead it must be interpreted more widely as public purpose instead of public use.
The majority opinion in this case was delivered by Justice Stevens. He pointed out that the disposition of the case in question revolves around whether New London’s development plan falls under the category of public purposes. Based on previous cases, that term has been broadly defined following the policy that defers judgment of public purpose to the legislature. Justice Stevens argued that the only issue was whether the plan was a public purpose, which the majority found that it did qualify as a public purpose, so the ruling was in favor of New London.
Justice Kennedy delivered the concurring opinion. He pointed out that the promotion of economic development has been an accepted power of the government. This promotion of economic development is not distinguished from other recognized public purposes. Kelo and the other property owners argued that allowing New London to use its eminent domain authority for economic developing would blur any line separating private and public seizures. Justice Kennedy strongly disagreed, stating that in pursuing public purposes, individuals may occasionally benefit. Once it has been decided that an action meets the criteria for public purposes, the amount of land and what land to be used is a decision to be left to the legislature’s discretion.
Chief Justice Hughes as well as Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas all join in the dissenting opinion. They argue that any law which seizes some property of A’s to give to B is unjust and unreasonable. Legislatures should not hold these powers. This limit on powers of the government has been abandoned with the ruling in this case, hidden under the label of economic developments. Under this label all private properties may be seized and given to private individuals so long as those individuals put the property to use in a way that benefits the public. This economic development label removes distinctions between public and private property usage, which serves to delete the takings clause words “for public use.” Justice Thomas states that the public use wording has acted as a safety check on eminent domain powers of the state. The ruling in this case removes that limit. Past cases have considered eminent domain powers to fall under state police powers. They are not the same because police powers, unlike eminent domain powers, require no compensations of any kind. As such, the judgment of the lower courts should be reversed in favor of the petitioners, the previous property owners.
Tammy McCollum
April 14, 2009
Brief: Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819)
Procedural History
In 1815, the legislature of New Hampshire attempted to invalidate or alter Dartmouth's charter in order to reinstate the College's deposed president, placing the ability to appoint positions in the hands of the governor, adding new members to the board of trustees, and creating a state board of visitors with veto power over trustee decisions. This effectively converted the school from a private to a public institution. The College's book of records, corporate seal, and other corporate property were removed. The trustees of the College objected and sought to have the actions of the legislature declared unconstitutional.
Legal Issue
Did the New Hampshire legislature unconstitutionally interfere with Dartmouth College's rights under the Contract Clause?
Facts of Case
In 1816, the New Hampshire legislature attempted to change Dartmouth College a privately funded institution into a state university. The legislature changed the school's corporate charter by transferring the control of trustee appointments to the governor. In an attempt to regain authority over the resources of Dartmouth College, the old trustees filed suit against William H. Woodward, who sided with the new appointees.
Statement of Rule
The decision ruled in favor of the College and invalidated the act of the New Hampshire Legislature, which in turn allowed Dartmouth to continue as a private institution and take back its buildings, seal, and charter. The majority opinion was, predictably, written by Marshall. The Court ruled that the College's corporate charter qualified as a contract between private parties, the King and the trustees, with which the legislature could not interfere. Even though the United States are no longer royal colonies, the contract is still valid because the Constitution says that a state cannot pass laws to impair a contract. The fact that the government had commissioned the charter did not transform the school into a civil institution. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion emphasized that the term "contract" referred to transactions involving individual property rights, not to "the political relations between the government and its citizens.
Tammy McCollum
April 21, 2009
Brief: Slaughter House Cases
Procedural History
The butchers not included in the monopoly claimed that the law deprived them of their right to "exercise their trade" and challenged it under the 13th and 14th amendments. The highest state court sustained the law.
Legal Issue
Do the 13th and 14th amendments guarantee federal protection of individual rights of all citizens of the United States against discrimination by their own state governments?
Facts of Case
A Louisiana law of 1869 created a state corporation for the slaughtering of livestock. The corporation was given exclusive power to slaughter livestock, and all other private slaughterhouses were required to close. Independent butchers could use the corporations’ facilities for a charge, but could not conduct independent operations.
Reasoning
The states have the proper police power to limit slaughter house operations for the health and safety of their residents. The meaning of the 13th and 14th amendments must be derived from the historical context of the problems they were designed to remedy, namely African slavery. The Congress, after the end of the Civil War, sought to strengthen the freedom of the former slaves by passing these amendments.
Holding
No, the 13th and 14th amendments do not guarantee federal protection of individual rights against discrimination by their own state governments.
Dissents
Field, stated that the privileges and immunities referred to in the 14th amendment included the right to pursue lawful employment. The clause in article 4, section 2 did for the protection of citizens of one state against discrimination by another state, what the 14th amendment does for the protection of every citizen against discrimination by his own state against him. [Bradley] felt that since the language of the 14th amendment was general in nature, and did not claim to protect only blacks, that it was meant to secure fundamental rights of any citizen against discrimination by his state.
Angela Pait
Slaughterhouse Cases
Procedural History
The butchers not included in the monopoly claimed that the law deprived them of their right to "exercise their trade" and challenged it under the 13th and 14th amendments. The highest state court sustained the law.
Legal Issue Whether the 13th and 14th amendments guarantee federal protection of individual rights of all citizens of the United States against discrimination by their own state governments.
Facts of Case A Louisiana law of 1869 created a state corporation for the slaughtering of livestock. The corporation was given exclusive power to slaughter livestock, and all other private slaughterhouses were required to close. Independent butchers could use the corporations’ facilities for a charge, but could not conduct independent operations.
Reasoning The states have the proper police power to limit slaughter house operations for the health and safety of their residents. The meaning of the 13th and 14th amendments must be derived from the historical context of the problems they were designed to remedy, namely African slavery. The Congress, after the end of the Civil War, sought to strengthen the freedom of the former slaves by passing these amendments.
Holding No, the 13th and 14th amendments do not guarantee federal protection of individual rights against discrimination by their own state governments.
Dissents Field, stated that the privileges and immunities referred to in the 14th amendment included the right to pursue lawful employment. The clause in article 4, section 2 did for the protection of citizens of one state against discrimination by another state, what the 14th amendment does for the protection of every citizen against discrimination by his own state against him. [Bradley] felt that since the language of the 14th amendment was general in nature, and did not claim to protect only blacks, that it was meant to secure fundamental rights of any citizen against discrimination by his state.