Crystal Russell

Constitutional Law

April 6, 2009

The Prize Case (1863):

            This case was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States in 1862 during the American Civil War. The Supreme Court’s decision declared constitutional the blockade of the Southern ports ordered by President Abraham Lincoln.  President Abraham Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of Southern ports in April 1861. Congress authorized him to declare a state of insurrection by the Act of July 13, 1861, Congress retroactively ratified all Lincoln’s military action. These cases involved the seizure of vessels bound for Confederate ports prior to July 13, 1861. Facing the secession of several states from the Union and the possibility of open hostilities, Abraham Lincoln did not ask Congress to declare war on the Confederate States of America as he believed this would be tantamount to recognizing the Confederacy as a nation. Lincoln instituted a naval blockade which had interesting legal ramifications, as nations do not blockade their own ports; rather they close them. By ordering a blockade, Lincoln essentially declared the Confederacy to be belligerents instead of insurrectionists. The Confederate States were mostly agrarian, and almost all of their machined and manufactured goods were imported. The legal issue was whether the President had authority to institute a blockade of southern ports? The Court’s holding was yes. The question before the court dealt with the seized ships. If there was no formal war, then capturing ships and impounding them is privacy. The Court looked to international law, and concluded that “it is not necessary to constitute war, that both parties should be acknowledged as independent nations or sovereign States.” The Court further stated that the President, as commander – in – chief of the armed forces, had the authority to proclaim a blockade as a method of waging war. By Acts of Congress the President is authorized to call out the militia and use the military and naval forces to suppress insurrection against the government of a state or the U.S. The proclamation of the blockade is official and conclusive evidence to the court that a state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure. The President was bound to meet the war in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress. Congress passed an Act “approving, legalizing, and making valid all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress.

Greg Brown 

Prize Cases (1863)

     After the Civil War broke out President Abraham Lincoln ordered a blockade of Confederate ports.  The president did not ask Congress to declare war because he did not wish to recognize the South as being independent of the United States.  Several ships were seized and their cargos confiscated.  The ships owners asked for their property to be returned.  They disputed whether or not the president had the authority to order the blockade.  In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court ruled President Lincoln did indeed have the authority to impose the blockade and confiscate the property.

     The court ruled Lincoln had the constitutional authority to impose the sanction because he is empowered to defend the country against invasion.  It ruled there is no distinction between foreign invaders or “States organized in rebellion”.  It is left up to the President to decide the amount of force necessary to suppress the threat.  The court also recognized that Congress later approved and legalized the actions of the President. 

     Justice Nelson offered the dissenting opinion of the court.  It concluded that the president had no authority to order the blockade.  Nelson wrote that there is “no doubt this is war”.  He wrote that there is no insurrection or war until it is recognized by Congress.  It further stated that the president has no authority to declare war or answer an attack without first obtaining approval for Congress.  They agreed that the president, with proper authorization, commands the military, however the president ordered the blockade without congressional authority, therefore the ships and its cargo should be returned to their owners. 

Juan Legarreta

                                    The Prize Cases (1863)

March 2nd 2009

Facing the secession of several states from the Union and the possibility of open hostilities, Abraham Lincoln did not ask Congress to declare war on the Confederate States of America as he believed this would be tantamount to recognizing the Confederacy as a nation. Instead, Lincoln instituted a naval blockade which had interesting legal ramifications, as nations do not blockade their own ports; rather they close them.

The Confederate States were mostly agrarian, and almost all of their machined and manufactured goods were imported. At the beginning of the war there was only one significant steel mill and manufactory in the South, the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, Virginia. Moreover, the southern economy depended on the export of cotton, tobacco and other crops. The blockade of the South resulted in the capture of dozens of American and foreign ships, both those attempting to run the highly efficient blockade and smuggle goods and munitions to the South as well as those attempting to smuggle exports from the South.

The Constitutional issues were that if President Lincoln was right in his actions to seize Navy ships during the blockade of the ports.

The ruling of the court was if there was no formal war, then capturing ships and impounding them is piracy. The Court looked to international law, and concluded that "it is not necessary to constitute war, that both parties should be acknowledged as independent nations or sovereign States." The Court further stated that the President, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, had the authority to proclaim a blockade as a method of waging war. The Court noted that Congress, in 1861, had adopted a law ratifying and approving the President's proclamation as well as other actions taken to prosecute the war, but did not declare whether such Congressional approval was necessary to legitimate the blockade.

Mr. Justice Nelson had the dissenting decision of the court in which he stated, the right of making war belongs exclusively to the supreme or sovereign power of the State. The whole military and naval power of the control of the President to meet the emergency and no civil war existed between the government and the states.

Amanda Hinshaw

Brief: The Prize Cases

      The facts of this case revolve around President Lincoln’s executive actions.  During the Civil War, President Lincoln ordered the blockade of ports in the south in April of 1861.  That blockade lead to the seizure of boats headed to Confederate ports before July of 1861.  Congress allowed President Lincoln to declare an insurrection state in July of 1861.  Congress then ratified President Lincoln’s past military actions in August of 1981.  Owners of the seized ships challenged President Lincoln’s actions because there was no state of war when he issued the blockade.

      The core constitutional issue in question is the extent of presidential power during non-war times.  The Constitution provides that the president can suspend the writ of habeas corpus “when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”  The issues were whether or not the Union was in rebellion or being invaded and whether or not the issuing of a blockade was a legal action under the Constitution’s Article II presidential powers.

      The holding of the Supreme Court was against the ship owners and for President Lincoln.  The Court found that there was a case of rebellion by the Confederate states resulting in a civil war after Fort Sumter was fired on in April of 1861.  Since the rebellion occurred the blockade was a legitimate use of presidential power.  Neither the president nor Congress could declare war against the Confederate states because they were a part of the Union, but because Confederate states chose to wage war on the American government the President had to act even before Congress authorized action based on the rebellion.

      The majority opinion of the Court was written by Justice Grier.  He stated that the question facing the court was whether or not a war state existed that would justify the President’s actions to subdue hostile forces.  Justice Grier stated that if the United States were invaded by foreign nations the president was not simply authorized to resist that invasion by use of force, he was bound by his responsibility to do so.  His position requires that he accept such a challenge without awaiting a grant of authority by the legislature.  The Court argued that it does not matter it the hostile group is a foreign invader or organized state rebellion, both are considered acts of war.  Therefore, the Court rules that President Lincoln had the authority to order a blockade of any port possessed by Confederate, rebellious states.

      The dissenting opinion in this case was written by Justice Nelson.  He argues that the power to make war is given by the Constitution to Congress.  Although other conflicts such as rebellion in states may in all actuality a type of war, in a legal sense nothing is a war unless Congress declares it so.  Congress alone holds the power to shift the country from a war state to a peace state and vice-versa.  The president has no power, granted or implied, that allow him to define what is war in a legal sense or in other words declare what is war and what is not.  Since President Lincoln had no power to declare a state of civil war, he had no cause or authority to blockade ports or seize ships and cargo.  Justice Nelson states that because war-defining power lies in the hands of Congress alone, President Lincoln’s assumption of that power and following blockade was illegal and a violation of the United States Constitution.

Adam McCreary

Constitutional Law

Case Brief: The Prize Cases

3/03/09

            After the firing on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, President Abraham Lincoln took decisive action by blockading southern ports. He executed this blockade without the authority of Congress. A special session of congress convened in July of 1861 declaring a state of insurrection, and in August the Congress retroactively ratified all of President Lincoln’s prior military actions. During the blockade a number of ships were seized and their cargo was confiscated. Several owners of the ships declared that this was unconstitutional because the President did not have the power to unilaterally take such action. They challenged the legality of these actions all the way to the Supreme Court.

            The issues involved in this case are quite clear. Can the President take decisive action when the nation has been attacked or must he wait for Congress to approve of his decisions? In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Lincoln’s actions. They determined that the constitution allows the President to respond appropriately when the nation has been attacked. The court determined that a de facto state of war existed after the attacks at Fort Sumter, and they did take into account that Congress approved the actions once they were able to convene the special session.

            Justice Grier wrote the majority opinion in the case. His opinion basically revolved around the idea that the President must have the ability to act when the nation has been attacked. He stated that “if a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force.” He also wrote that the force used by the President was appropriate.

            Justice Nelson wrote the dissenting opinion. He basically argued that there are no exceptions in this case. Congress is the body that must declare war, and until they do, any actions by the President are illegal and void. Justice Nelson would not even recognize a state of war until July 13th 1861. Therefore, he felt that the ships and the cargo should be returned.

Hally Kirby 

Brief: Ex Parte Milligan (1866)

Facts of the Case:  Lambdin Milligan was a farmer that lived near Ft. Wayne Indiana that protested the American Civil War. He and four others had planned to Union weapons and break into Union prisoner of war camps. On October 5th, 1864 Milligan was arrested at his home by the General of the Indiana military. Milligan had not been nor was currently in any branch of the military. On October 21st, 1864 he was charged, convicted and sentenced to death, all under a military commission. In 1865, Milligan petitioned the Circuit Court of Indiana to be discharged from unlawful imprisonment.

Constitutional Issues: judicial jurisdiction.

Ruling of the Court: The Court decided that since there was indeed a civil court that was fully capable and currently operational of handling Milligan’s legal issues, that a military court or martial law concerning this particular case could not be legal. Military tribunals would only be allowed to hold citizens without being charged if the habeas corpus was suspended. This does not include being tried and convicted, like Milligan was. “Martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real.”

Concurring Opinion: Milligan's trial and conviction by a military commission were overturned. The Court decided that there was no indictment against Milligan, since the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 stated that political prisoners who could not be indicted by the grand jury should be released. The President, without the proper authority of the Congress, cannot go forward in the trials and punishments of civilians without proper and necessary cause to do so.

Angela Pait

Korematsu v. United States

Procedural History

Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 which, during a state of war with Japan and as a protection against espionage and sabotage, was broadcast by the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command under authority of Executive Order No. 9066 and the Act of March 21, 1942, and which directed the exclusion after May 9, 1942, from a described West Coast military area of all persons of Japanese ancestry, held constitutional as of the time it was made and when the petitioner ,an American citizen of Japanese descent whose home was in the described area ,violated it. The provisions of other orders requiring persons of Japanese ancestry to report to assembly centers and providing for the detention of such persons in assembly and relocation centers were separate, and their validity is not in issue in this proceeding.

Legal Issue

American citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted in a federal district court for remaining in San Leandro, California, a Military Area, contrary to Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General

Facts of Case

 One of the series of orders and proclamations, a curfew order, which, like the exclusion order here, was promulgated pursuant to Executive Order 9066, subjected all persons of Japanese ancestry in prescribed West Coast military areas to remain in their residences from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. As is the case with the exclusion order here, that prior curfew order

Statement of Rule

 The Endo case, post, graphically illustrates the difference between the validity of an order to exclude and the validity of a detention order after exclusion has been affected.

Holding

 Even though evacuation and detention in the assembly center were inseparable, the order under which the petitioner was convicted was nevertheless valid. Affirmed.

Concurrence

 MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring. According to my reading of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, it was an offense for Korematsu to be found in Military Area No. 1, the territory wherein he was previously living, except within the bounds of the established Assembly Center of that area. Even though the various orders issued by General DeWitt are deemed a comprehensive code of instructions, their tenor is clear, and not contradictory. They put upon Korematsu the obligation to leave Military Area No. 1, but only by the method prescribed in the instructions, i.e., by reporting to the Assembly Center. I am unable to see how the legal considerations that led to the decision in Hirabayashi v. United States, fail to sustain the military order which made the conduct now in controversy a crime.

Bridget Tognazzini

Korematsu v. United States

The facts of the case: President Franklin issued an order to have all people of Japanese descent living in a military area to an internment camp in California. Korematsu, an American citizen of Japanese descent, refused to obey the wartime order to leave his home and report to a relocation camp for Japanese Americans. He was arrested and convicted. After losing in the Court of Appeals in California, he appealed to the United States Supreme Court, challenging the constitutionality of the deportation order.
The core constitutional issues: Did the President and Congress have the right to be able to send a whole race of people into internment camp? The core constitutional rights were the war clauses in the constitution, if what they did was unconstitutional.
The ruling of the Court: The court ruled 6-3 that the government had the right during times of war to hold anyone they wanted to.
The majority opinion: Black delivered the opinion: The Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of Japanese Americans from the military areas because the needs of national security in a time of crisis justified the exclusion orders. The war powers of the President and Congress which are in the Constitution provided the legal basis for the majority decision.
The concurring opinion: Frankfurter concurred with the “provisions of the Constitution which confer on the Congress and the President powers to enable this country to wage war are as much part of the Constitution as provisions looking to a nation at peace.” He believed that a law was a law in time of war.

Katy Navarro

Korematsu v. United States (1944)

 Facts of the Case: During World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Presidential Executive Order 9066 and congressional statutes gave the military authority to exclude citizens of Japanese ancestry from areas deemed critical to national defense and potentially vulnerable to espionage. The order also gave permission to military commanders to regulate who entered or stayed in such areas. Initially there was just a curfew on residents of Japanese decent, but ultimately they were ordered to evacuate to inland detention centers.  Congress passed legislation which established penalties for violating these regulations. Korematsu refused to leave his home and remained in San Leandro, California and violated Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the U.S. Army.  He was arrested and convicted in federal district court for violating the exclusion order.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari

Constitutional issue: Did the President and Congress go beyond their war powers by implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans of Japanese descent?  (Basically the government is able to have people leave an area because of their race.)

Ruling of the Court: No! In a 6-3 decision, the Court sided with the government ruling that the exclusion order was constitutional and held that the need to protect against espionage outweighed Korematsu's individual rights and the rights of Americans of Japanese decent. Justice Black argued that compulsory exclusion, though constitutionally suspect, is justified during circumstances of "emergency and peril."  Public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions. 

Concurring Opinion: Justice Frankfurter…stating that the validity of action under the War power must be judged wholly in the context of war.  Also to recognize the powers are merely precautions.

Dissenting Opinions:  From Justice’s Robert’s, Murphy, and Jackson.  Justice Murphy claims that the exclusion of “all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien...on a plea of military necessity in the absence of martial law ought not to be approved” and goes on to say that “such exclusion goes over the brink of constitutional power and falls into the ugly abyss of racism”

Caleb Mitchell

Korematsu v United States (1944)

 Main Facts of the Case-

            During World War II the United States was at war with the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan; the United States saw the Japan as a major threat after the attacks on Pearl Harbor. The military decided that there was a ‘viable’ threat from all persons of “Japanese decent” to allow the creation of interment camps where the Japanese people were forced to live until the war was over, or go fight the Germans for the Allies. Toyosaburo Korematsu refused to leave his home violating the order for all persons to report to the camps, he was then arrested and tried for disobedience in time of war. The case carried through the courts to the Supreme Court.

 Core Constitutional Issues-

            Whether or not the Congress and President had over stepped their bounds of the War Powers by ordering the population into basically prison camps. The Court would examine whether the Nation would have the rights to do so again.

 Ruling of the Court-

            The Court ruled that there was a certain line that could not be crossed by the Congress unless crossing the line would allow the nation to wage the war successfully.

 Majority Ruling-

            The majority decision was that there were things that could not be done on basis of race or nationality, but could be allowed when it would let the nation wage the war successfully. Justice Black ruled with the majority that there could not be issues raised on the basis of race or ethnicity other than to allow the successful waging on the war. Justice Frankfurter concurred with the majority in the same manner as Justice Black.

 Minority Decision-

            The minority decision was that there is no excuse for the allowing of the infringement of the human rights of a racial group, even with the need of desperation for winning a war. Justices Murphy and Jackson both required that the human rights of the Japanese overruled the right for nation to hold them as prisoners of war.

            In 1948 and 1984 the government allotted funds for paying a retribution payment to all of the families that filed for restitution payments to make up for the suffering of them and their families.

Joshua Kerr

Brief: Korematsu v. United States

In February of 1942, President Roosevelt issued an executive order which allowed for the creation of special areas and empowered military commanders to regulate the people within those areas in hopes of prevent espionage and sabotage.  Shortly after this order, Congress made disobeying these regulations a federal crime.  The basic result was the forced removal and internment of Japanese Americans in the name of national security.  Where actual internment was not implemented, curfews were.  A case challenging these curfews was heard in 1943 with the court ruling in favor of the government.  Toyosaburo Korematsu, an American of Japanese descent was convicted on federal charges of refusing to comply with these orders and appealed to the Supreme Court for in hopes of overturning his conviction. 

There are two major constitutional issues in play for this case.  The first is the right of habeas corpus, or the right to challenge unlawful detention.  In this case, Korematsu was challenging whether or not he was able to truly appeal his conviction.  The second and primary constitution question is the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that no person will be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

In this case, like the curfew case listed previously, the court ruled in favor of the government.  This denied the appeal of conviction of Korematsu.