Kellia Jones
Dred Scott vs. Stanford
March 10th, 2009
Facts: The Dred Scott Decision was a decision by the United States Supreme Court that ruled that people of African descent imported into the United States and held as slaves, or their descendants—whether or not they were slaves—were not legal persons and could never be citizens of the United States, and that the United States Congress had no authority to prohibit slavery in federal territories.
Issues: Was Dred Scott free or a slave?
Ruling of the Court: Dred Scott was a slave. States do not have the right to claim an individual’s property that was fairly theirs in another state. Property cannot cease to exist as a result of changing jurisdiction. The majority decision held that Africans residing in America, whether free or slave, could not become United States citizens and the plaintiff therefore lacked the capacity to file a lawsuit. Furthermore, the parts of the Missouri Compromise creating free territories were unconstitutional because Congress had no authority to abolish slavery in federal territories. Judgment of Circuit Court for the District of Missouri reversed and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Scott went to trial in June of 1847, but lost on a technicality because he couldn't prove that he and his wife Harriet were owned by Emerson's widow. The following year the Missouri Supreme Court decided that case should be retried. In an 1850 retrial, the the St Louis circuit court ruled that Scott and his family were free.
Majority Opinion: seven out of nine Justices on the Supreme Court declared no slave or descendant of a slave could be a U.S. citizen, or ever had been a U.S. citizen. As a non-citizen, the court stated, Scott had no rights and could not sue in a Federal Court and must remain a slav
Katy Navarro
3-7-09
Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857)
Dred Scott was a slave that traveled with his owner Dr. John Emerson. Emerson was an army surgeon so he was transferred often. After an extended stay in Illinois, a Free State, as well as Wisconsin Territory, where slavery was prohibited as well gave Scott the legal standing to make a claim for freedom. In 1837 Emerson was moved to St. Louis, but left Scott and his wife behind for several months, hiring them out. Once again Emerson was transferred, this time to Fort Jessup, Louisiana where he married Irene Sanford and then sent for Scott and his family. Emerson was sent to fight in the Seminole War in Florida. After his return, Emerson moved to the free territory of Iowa. Emerson died unexpectedly at the age of forty. Scott and his family continued to work for Irene Emerson for three years. Then in 1846, Scott tried to purchase his freedom from Irene Emerson, but she refused. So Dred Scott brought suit against Mrs. Emerson to obtain his freedom on the grounds that he had lived in a free territory for several years, thereby making him free as well.
Constitutional Issue: Can a Slave become a citizen, and as such be entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by the Constitution to a citizen? Basically, the constitutional issue is whether or not Scott can be counted as a citizen, therefore deserving of those enumerated rights and protections.
Holding of the court: States do not have the right to claim an individual’s property that was fairly theirs in another state. Property cannot cease to exist as a result of changing jurisdiction. The majority decision held that Africans residing in America, whether free or slave, could not become US citizens, therefore the plaintiff lacked the capacity to file a lawsuit. The case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the court. Six justices agreed with the ruling (Wayne, Grier, Daniel, and Campbell); Samuel Nelson Concurred with the ruling but not its reasoning, and Benjamin Curtis and John McLean dissented on the grounds that Scott should have been recognized as a citizen, because he had the necessary qualifications.
**This case was only the second time that the Supreme Court had found an act of Congress to be unconstitutional. (The first time was 54 years earlier in Marbury v. Madison)
Crystal Russell
Constitutional Law
March 10, 2009
Dred Scott v. Sandford
In the year of 1834, Dred Scott was a slave belonging to Dr. Emerson, who was a surgeon in the army. That year Dr. Emerson took Dred Scott from the state of Missouri to the military post at Rock Island, Illinois, and held him there as a slave until the month of April or May of 1836. In 1836, Dr. Emerson removed Scott from Rock Island, Illinois to the military post at Fort Snelling, situate on the west bank of the Mississippi river, in the Territory known as Upper Louisiana and held Scott in slavery until 1838. In the year 1838, Emerson removed Scott from Fort Snelling to the State of Missouri, where they have ever since resided. In May of 1854, the cause went before a jury. On the trial of this cause by the jury, the plaintiff, to maintain the issues on his part, read to the jury the following agreed statement of facts. No further testimony was given to the jury by either party. This case has been argued twice. States do not have the right to claim an individual’s property that was theirs in another state. Property cannot cease to exist as a result of changing jurisdiction. The majority decision held that Africans residing in America, could not become a U.S. citizen. The opinion entertained and acted upon in England was impressed upon the colonies they founded on this side of the Atlantic. A black of the African race was regarded by them as an article of property, and held, and bought and sold as such, in every one of the thirteen colonies which united in the Declaration of Independence; and afterwards formed the Constitution of the United States.
Anna Bavido
Constitutional Law
Dr. Rutledge
February 24th, 2009
Clinton V. City of New York
Possibly the only item in the historical 1994 “Contract with America” that Democratic President Bill Clinton supported was granting the Executive Office the power of line-item veto. Line-item veto allows the President to strike out certain items of an appropriations bill and then sign into law his edited version. A group of Congressmen sued initially, but the Supreme Court threw the case out because of the lack of an injured party. Once Clinton had used the line-item veto, several organizations who missed out on funding as a result sued. The cases were consolidated before a U.S. District Court.
The part of the Presentment Clause that this case was concerned with reads “Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.” Does line-item veto violate the separation of powers? Yes. Specifically, does the line-item veto violate the Presentment Clause of Section Seven of Article One of the Constitution? Yes. Is the executive power of line-item veto unconstitutional? Yes.
The Supreme Court confirmed, in a 6-3 vote, the District Court’s ruling of unconstitutionality on grounds of it violating the principle of separated powers and the Presentment Clause.
Anna Bavido
Constitutional Law
Dr. Rutledge
March 10th, 2009
Dustin Gunnells
American Constitutional Law
Case Brief New York v. United States
3/10/09
In the court case New York v. United States it was a Supreme Court Ruling. This case took place in the year 1992. What had happened was that Justice Sandra Day O’Conner who was writing for the majority saw that the “Take Title” provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 exceed the powers under the Commerce Clause. The Low-Level Radioactive Policy Amendments Act was pretty much a source to help solve the problem of what to do with radioactive waste.
This became a problem at a national level because of the states way of dealing with the problem. New York was a willing participant in the compromise, but after the Act passes, the state attempted to renege. The Act gave three incentives for the states. The first two incentives were held constitutional. The first incentive was monetary incentive. The second incentive was the access incentive, which allowed states to reprimand states that missed certain deadlines by raising surcharges or just denying access to disposal at the states facilities. The third incentive was requiring states to take title which was the assume liability for waste generated within their borders if they failed to comply, was held to be impermissibly coercive and a threat to state sovereignty, thereby violating the Tenth Amendment.
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Blackmun and Justice Stevens. He stressed that the Act was a product of cooperative federalism, a situation where the States bargained among themselves to achieve compromises for Congress to sanction. He was also noting that Congress does have the power to directly regulate radioactive waste. Today the Court gives Congress fewer incentives to defer to the wishes of state officials in achieving local solutions to local problems. What we found out in this case was that Congress does have the power to control radioactive waste and that the court gave Congress fewer incentives to achieve goals after this case.
Alisa Miles
Constitutional Law
3-15-09
New York V United States
The facts of the case: The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 requires states alone or in groups to dispose of radioactive waste within their borders. New York state and other neighboring counties were upset because of resistance they were experiencing from neighboring residents about the lack of cooperation in disposing of radioactive waste. New York filed an argument in regarding congressional authority to regulate state waste management. The case was argued on March 30, 1992 and decided on June 19th, 1992. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor saw that the Low-Level Waste Act went beyond the powers of the Commerce Clause. There were 3 provisions for the states under the Waste Act. The first was financial gain. The second allowed states to punish other states by adding surcharges if they missed the deadline for disposal. The third provision was making states take “title” in other words holding them accountable for waste produced within their borders. This was a threat to state sovereignty which violated the 10th amendment.
The core constitutional issues: The constitutional issues in the case were whether or not the Low-Level Waste Act violated the 10th Amendment and the guarantee clause of Article 4.
The ruling of the court: In a 6-3 vote, the Court upheld two out of the three provisions.
The first was one was that congress did have the authority using the Commerce Clause to
offer incentives to the states for state-waste management. They also upheld the third
provision which was that states assume liability for low-level waste under the act. These
two types of actions would hinder the constitutions division between the federal and state
government.
The majority opinion: Sandra Day O’Connor who wrote the majority opinion stated that
the first two provisions commanded state governments into federal regu
Michelle Grimmer
Case Brief for New York v. United States
Constitutional Law
March 9, 2009
This case had to do with New York wanting to know why Congress should have the right to regulate each States regulation of waste management. New York thought the the three provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 was a violation of each states constitutional right.
Does the Low-Level Waste Act violate the Tenth Amendment and the "guarantee clause" of Article Four?
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 required states alone or in compacts with other states to dispose of such radioactive waste within their borders. New York State and Allegany and Courtland counties were frustrated in their compliance efforts by resistance from residents to proposed radioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from neighboring states. New York filed suit against the federal government, questioning the authority of Congress to regulate state waste management.
In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld two of the three provisions of the Act under review, reasoning that Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to use financial rewards and access to disposal sites as incentives for state waste management. The third provision, the "take-title" qualification, stipulated that states must take legal ownership and liability for low-level waste or by the regulatory act. "Either type of federal action," wrote Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments." This last provision violated the Tenth Amendment.
Information for this brief was found on March 9, 2009 at The Oyez Project, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), available at: <http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_543/>
Bridget Tognazzini
March 6, 2009
New York v. United States
Facts of the case: The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act provided three incentives for states to comply with the agreement for waste removal. The first incentive allowed states to collect gradually increasing surcharges for waste received from other states. The second incentive allowed states to reprimand states that missed certain deadlines by raising surcharges or eventually denying access to disposal at those state's facilities completely. The third incentive required states to "take title" and assume liability for waste generated within their borders if they failed to comply.
Core constitutional issues: The tenth amendment, Congress's power under the Taxing and Spending Clause, and the commerce clause.
Ruling of the court: Found that the "Take Title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.
Majority opinion: By O’Connor, stated after noting the constitutionality of the first two incentives, she characterized the "take title" incentive as an attempt to "commandeer" the state governments by directly compelling them to participate in the federal regulatory program. The distinction was that with respect to the "take title" provision, the States had to choose between conforming to federal regulations or taking title to the waste. Since Congress cannot directly force States to legislate such coercion would be counter to the federalist structure of government, in which a "core of state sovereignty" is enshrined in the Tenth Amendment.
Dissenting opinion: Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. He stressed that the Act was a product of "cooperative federalism," a situation where the States "bargained among themselves to achieve compromises for Congress to sanction." Noting that Congress does have the power to directly regulate radioactive waste (as opposed to compelling state legislatures to regulate according to their scheme), White said that the "ultimate irony of the decision today is that in its formalistically rigid obeisance to 'federalism,' the Court gives Congress fewer incentives to defer to the wishes of state officials in achieving local solutions to local problems."
Margaret Dawson
Due March 10/turned in March 24
New York v United States 1992
This case dealt with the low-level radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 required states alone or in compacts with other states to dispose of such radioactive waste within their borders. People were frustrated in the compliance efforts from residents who proposed radioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from other surrounding states. New York filed suit against the federal government, wonder if Congress had any real authority to regulate state waste management.
The Constitutional issue is does the Low-Level Waste Act violate the Tenth Amendment and the guarantee clause of Article Four?
The courts reasoning was since the court upheld two of the three provisions of the Act under review. Saying Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to use financial rewards and access to disposal sites as incentives for state waste management. The last provision of this violated the tenth amendment because "take-title" qualification, stipulated that states must take legal ownership and liability for low-level waste or by the regulatory act and this would not be consistent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments
There was a 6-3 vote in favor to uphold two of the three provisions that was look at during this case. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor gave a full opinion on what she thought of the Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause and how it fit in with this case.
Dred Scott V. Sanford
Dred Scott was the slave of Irene Sanford, the widow of Scott’s former owner Dr. John Emerson. Dred Scott had lived in a free state, Illinois, and a free territory, Wisconsin. Scott, after unsuccessfully trying to purchase his freedom from the widow, sued for his freedom on the grounds that he had been unjustly held as a slave in a free state. The case followed a long and convoluted path through the Missouri state courts, before ending up in federal court and, eventually, before the Supreme Court.
Are Africans imported from abroad, Dred Scott specifically, and their descendents citizens of the United States? No. Can noncitizens sue in a U.S. Court? No. Can Congress restrict slavery in the States and territories? No. Can territorial legislative bodies ban slavery? No.
The Supreme Court went against all precedent in its decision that slaves brought into free states are still slaves. They boldly went beyond contradicting precedent, to ruling that any African was a noncitizen, no matter how long they had lived here and regardless of their status as freed or enslaved. The Court confirmed slaves to be the property of their owners, therefore they were private property that could not be taken without due process. The Court ambitiously went further to rule that Congress had no authority or right to regulate in any form slavery in any State, effectively annulling the Missouri Compromise. Not yet satisfied, the Court went on to say that territorial legislatures did not have the power to ban slavery.
Anna Bavido
Constitutional Law
Dr. Rutledge
March 10th, 2009
Dred Scott V. Sanford
Dred Scott was the slave of Irene Sanford, the widow of Scott’s former owner Dr. John Emerson. Dred Scott had lived in a free state, Illinois, and a free territory, Wisconsin. Scott, after unsuccessfully trying to purchase his freedom from the widow, sued for his freedom on the grounds that he had been unjustly held as a slave in a free state. The case followed a long and convoluted path through the Missouri state courts, before ending up in federal court and, eventually, before the Supreme Court.
Are Africans imported from abroad, Dred Scott specifically, and their descendents citizens of the United States? No. Can noncitizens sue in a U.S. Court? No. Can Congress restrict slavery in the States and territories? No. Can territorial legislative bodies ban slavery? No.
The Supreme Court went against all precedent in its decision that slaves brought into free states are still slaves. They boldly went beyond contradicting precedent, to ruling that any African was a noncitizen, no matter how long they had lived here and regardless of their status as freed or enslaved. The Court confirmed slaves to be the property of their owners, therefore they were private property that could not be taken without due process. The Court ambitiously went further to rule that Congress had no authority or right to regulate in any form slavery in any State, effectively annulling the Missouri Compromise. Not yet satisfied, the Court went on to say that territorial legislatures did not have the power to ban slavery.
Student Name: Amanda Hinshaw
Date: 3-3-09
Brief: Dred Scott v. Sandford
The facts of this case revolve around a man named Dred Scott who was a slave in the United States during the 1800s. Scott belonged to an army surgeon, Dr. Emerson who was stationed in Missouri. Dr. Emerson was transferred in 1834 to a base in Illinois and took Scott along with him. Slavery had previously been forbidden in the state of Illinois. Dr. Emerson was transferred again in 1836 to an area of Louisiana Territory and again brought Scott along. This particular area was a region where the Missouri Compromise allowed slavery. Finally Dr. Emerson returned to Missouri in 1838, once again bringing Scott. Eight years after their return to Missouri, Scott brought a suit in one of Missouri’s state courts. Scott claimed that by living in a free area he was now a free man. The state court ruled in Scott’s favor, but on review the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the ruling. Friends of Scott and abolitionists arranged a fake sale where Scott was bought by Dr. Emerson’s brother-in-law after Dr. Emerson’s death to change the case’s jurisdiction to under a Missouri federal circuit court. The federal court held with the state’s supreme court, so Scott appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The core constitutional issue or question in this case revolves around citizenship. In particular the question in this case was whether or not Dred Scott, as a former slave and descendant of slaves, could be considered a state citizen in the sense of constitutional meaning and entitled to the rights, protections, and privileges guaranteed to such a person.
The holding was against Scott. The ruling of the court was that because Dred Scott was a slave descendant, he could not be considered a citizen under Article III of the United States Constitution. Since he was not a citizen, the constitutional protections and rights did not apply to him. Particularly he had no standing to sue because he was not a citizen.
The majority opinion of the Court was delivered by Chief Justice Taney. He made two points that framed his argument. First, a person who is a state citizen is not necessarily a United States citizen or vice versa. Second, a slave could be free but still not be a citizen of a state or the United States because he or she was a descendant of slaves. Chief Justice Taney claimed that to understand who could be considered citizens under the Constitution, the court had to examine whom the original thirteen colonies considered citizens. The prevailing public opinion at the time the Declaration of Independence was written held that “negros” were inferior. That universal opinion, claimed Taney, is evident in the Declaration and early American history for the state governments and the federal government. A change in public opinion does not give the court the right or authority to change the intensions of the Constitution.
Six justices, Campbell, Catron, Grier, Nelson, Wayne, and Daniel concurred with Chief Justice Taney. These justices claim that the Missouri Compromise declares slavery illegal in every area of land taken from France called Louisiana, which does not include Missouri. Scott’s counsel stressed that the Constitution gives Congress the right to create and remove rules in territories or other properties owned by the U.S. However the court believes that provision is no relation to the case in question. The Constitution, according to these justices, gives no power to the national government for creating or developing colonies around the U.S. ruled for the government’s pleasure. Nor does the Constitution allow the national government to expand its territory except by admitting new states.
The dissenting opinions in this case were delivered by Justice Mclean and Justice Curtis. Justice Mclean points out that various treaties have allowed citizenship rights to people of all colors. No one has doubted these rights and no courts have challenged the rights either. The rights were also not naturalized under congressional action. He further argues that the founders purposefully prevented the discussion of slavery in the Constitution. They did not feel the need to address the issue because they believed slavery would decline and eventually become extinct. The issue of slavery was addressed by the Missouri Compromise. It became operational by an act of Congress. Justice Mclean argues that if Congress can establish territorial governments, legally, then the court does not have the right to control Congress’ discretion in this area. For this reason the act cannot be voided. Justice Curtis dissents on the claim that slavery is a political question. He argues many of the thirteen original colonies held blacks as citizens before the Constitution and after its adoption. Nothing in the US Constitution took away that citizenship. Also persons born on the state soil are citizens of the state and as such American citizens. He claims the government has no power to disenfranchise these citizens. Allowing the court to insert an exception to the Constitution’s passage concerning territories that allows slavery when it was not originally there in any portion of the Constitution leaves the court no jurisdiction. Since there is no legal basis, the issue is politically, not constitutionally based and therefore the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction in the matter.
Greg Brown
02-09-2009
The Civil Rights Act of 1875
The law was passed on March 1st 1875 stating all persons, regardless of race were entitled to equal access to inns, theatres, public transportation and other places of public amusement. It was rarely enforced but five cases did eventually reach the Supreme Court. The five cases were heard together and were referred to as The Civil Rights Cases. Two of the cases were appeals made by plaintiffs and the other three reach the Supreme Court because the lower courts could not agree on the constitutionality of the law.
The Supreme Court heard the cases in 1883 and in an 8-1 decision ruled the act “declared void at least so far as its operation in the several states concerned”. The court rejected arguments that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments granted Congress the power to protect the rights of citizens in both private and state instances. The court ruled that the Thirteenth Amendment only abolished slavery and the Fourteenth Amendment offered citizenship to former slaves and only limited protection from state discrimination. The court further stated that Congress had no authority to intervene and stated a person must pursue relief in these matters from the states.
In his dissenting opinion Justice John Marshall Harlan argued that the Thirteenth Amendment had not been interpreted correctly. He suggested that the amendment gave Congress the right to protect the rights of former slaves. He argued that “such discrimination practiced by corporations and individuals in the exercise of their functions is a form of servitude; therefore the Thirteenth Amendment which abolished slavery should apply. Harlan believed that Congress had a duty to “secure and protect rights belonging to citizens”. He continued by writing that Congress had the express power to rule on this matter and that “every one must bow” to the power.
Tasha Parker
March 9, 2009
Civil Right Cases
The Civil Rights Acts of 1875 state that equality of all persons in the enjoyment of transportation, hotels, theatres, and any place of public amusement. Criminal penalties could be placed on any persons who did not adhere to the Act openly showing discrimination. Even though these business are privately owned they are still public utilities that were use to exercise public functions.
Constitutional issues were that did the act actually violate the Tenth amendment of the constitution which reserves all power not granted to the national government to the sates or the people and was this infringement of personal freedom of choice. Did this act and amendment prohibit discrimination for states but permit to private owners?
In the end the court said that the fourth tenth amendment restrains only applies to state actions and the fifth section of the same amendment states that it can only be enforced on the sate and did not authorize national legislation on subjects in the domain of the state. Meaning that acts of racial discrimination were considered private acts of wrong doings and the national government could do nothing about besides maybe frown upon it. The decision was eight to one.
Tim Ross
Constitutional Law
Case Brief
The Civil Rights Cases
March 10, 2009
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 prohibited any person from denying a citizen “the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement.” Five cases were heard together as the Civil Rights Cases. People were indicted for violating the act by denying accommodations to blacks in a hotel, a theater, an opera house, and a ladies’ car on a train. Two cases went to the Supreme Court on writ of error sued out by the plaintiffs in federal circuit courts. Three cases were certified to the Supreme Court because lower-court judges disagreed on the constitutionality of the act. In an eight to one decision, the Court held the law unconstitutional. Justice Bradley gave the opinion.
The question before the Court was whether the act was constitutional. The act does not entitle a person to the privileges in it. It prevents those privileges from being denied because of race or color. Congress claimed the authority to pass the act based on the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court found that the amendment was specifically addressing state acts and not individual rights. The Court argued that the amendment did not give Congress the power to regulate private rights or municipal laws. It only gives redress against state laws. Rights and privileges are secured by prohibition against state laws and state proceedings that violate a person’s rights.
The Tenth Amendments says that powers are not delegated to the United States by the Constitution; they are reserved for the state or the people. Individuals cannot violate the civil rights addressed in the Constitution, only states. An individual can commit a crime against someone, but cannot take their right to vote. Only a state can do that.
The Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to pass laws to abolish slavery. However, the Court found that “it would be running the slavery argument into the ground” to apply it to every act of discrimination. At some point a former slave has to become an ordinary citizen rather than having a special, favored status.
Justice Harlan gave the dissent. He felt the Court was in error in finding Congress to be without power under the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment to establish regulations, and in finding the act unconstitutional. The Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to enforce appropriate legislation against the badges and burdens of slavery. Congress has to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery even if committed by individuals. Since slavery was based on the inferiority of a race, their freedom involves immunity from and protection against all discrimination. This requires Congress to enforce the amendment whether a state or an individual violates it. Further, the acts of the plaintiffs created a badge of slavery that was in violation of both amendments.
Adam McCreary
Constitutional Law
Case Brief: The Civil Rights Cases
03/10/09
The constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was brought into question before the Supreme Court in a compilation of five different cases that were all heard at once and became known as the Civil Rights Cases. The act stated that “the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres, and other places of public amusement.” This act was often ignored or not enforced. When the law was actually enforced, citizens who were affected sued claiming that the law was unconstitutional. Of the five cases brought before the court, two were appeals and the other three were sent to the court when the lower courts could not come to a decision. These individuals were indicted for refusing service to blacks in a hotel, a theater, an opera house, and a ladies’ car on a train.
There were some interesting constitutional issues that arose from these cases. Did the Civil Rights Act of 1875 violate the 10th amendment by infringing on state authority? It also brought into question the affect of the Civil War amendments on individual citizens. These amendments clearly were aimed at the states, but Congress was attempting to pass laws that were based on these amendments that affected individual citizens.
In an 8-1 decision, the court ruled that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 did violate the constitution for a number of reasons. Justice Bradley delivered the majority opinion of the court. He began by stating that the court was not deciding whether the idea of discrimination based on race was acceptable or not. They were simply determining if Congress had the power to legislate against individual discrimination of individual people. The majority determined that this was not protected by the constitution and would give the national government too much authority. Justice Bradley also questioned where these types of legislation end if it were allowed to continue.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan claimed that the court was defining the constitution too narrowly. He stated that when an individual acts publicly as a businessman or the like, is subject to the same legislation as the state. He also argued that the act did not fundamentally harm or restrict state power.
Juan Legarreta
March 10, 2009
Between 1866 and 1875, Congress passed several civil rights acts to implement the 13th and 14th amendments. One was the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which imposed various criminal penalties against private businesses that practiced racial discrimination. Penalties were imposed on any owner of a public establishment or conveyance who practiced racial discrimination in the conduct of his or her business. Many Northerners and Southerners opposed to Reconstruction saw the law as an infringement of personal freedom of choice.
By the 1870s, various white supremacist groups, including the Ku Klux Klan, were using both nonviolent and violent means throughout the South to influence politics and intimidate African Americans. In 1877, when withdrawal of federal troops brought the Reconstruction period to a close, Southern legislatures began to pass laws and establish practices which created separate societies for whites and African Americans.
A number of cases involving application of the federal law were collected in this case and presented to the Supreme Court during the term 1882-1883. African-American citizens protested their exclusion from a hotel dining room in Topeka, Kansas; from the opera in New York City; from the better seats of a San Francisco theater; and from a car set aside for ladies on a train. The case examined the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in light of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Did the Act of 1875 violate the Constitution? Was the conduct of business by a private person subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment? Did the amendment prohibit State governments from discriminating, but permit private persons to discriminate under “freedom of choice” (that is, “We reserve the right to refuse service to anyone”)? What protections did the 13th and 14th amendments provide for citizens?
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was constitutional. The 13th and 14th amendments were clearly intended to “remove the last vestiges of slavery” from America. To permit private discrimination would be to “permit the badges and incidents of slavery” to linger in the South. The Federal Government had the authority to protect citizens from private and State actions that deprived them of their rights. The intent and purpose of the 14th Amendment was to prevent discrimination in any form by the State governments. The amendment declares, “…nor shall any State deprive citizens of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws….” This is clearly and precisely not a limit on private action. It speaks to State action only. The Civil Rights Act was, therefore, unconstitutional and interfered with the private rights of citizens to use, manage, and protect their businesses and property. Private citizens have a right to decide the conditions under which they operate their businesses. Outside interference (that is, federal intervention) would amount to tyranny.
The 8-1 decision of the Court was delivered by Justice Joseph P. Bradley, with John Marshall Harlan of Kentucky alone in dissent. The Court decided that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional. Neither the 13th nor the 14th amendment empowers the Congress to legislate in matters of racial discrimination in the private sector, Bradley wrote. “The 13th Amendment has respect, not to distinctions of race…but to slavery.…” The 14th Amendment, he continued, applied to State, not private, actions; furthermore, the abridgment of rights presented in this case are to be considered as ordinary civil injuries rather than the imposition of badges of slavery.
Bradley commented that “individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the 14th Amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all state legislation, and state action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws.” Therefore, the Court limited the impact of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
Segregation by race in the private sector was given approval by the Court. “Whites only” signs had begun to appear across the South by this time and in the North as well. This decision was one of several which gave legal standing to efforts intended to return to the social order of pre-Civil War days. The major decision on segregation in America came 13 years later in Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896, when the “separate but equal” doctrine was seen as providing “equal protection of the laws” to African Americans
Grant Cosby
23 March, 2009
Heart of Atlanta Motel case brief
Rutledge
The Heart of Atlanta Hotel chain was a group of hotels around major cities and highways near and around Atlanta, Georgia. After the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed discrimination of patronage based on race, the hotel chain still refused to rent rooms to African Americans. So instead of getting sued themselves, they sued the federal government. In particular they brought into question the right of the federal government to pass a law that regulated private accommodations. This, of course calls into question whether the federal government had overstepped their bounds in regulating intrastate commerce, as well as whether the law that was enacted was necessary and proper.
The case made it past the three-person district court and was referred to the supreme court. The ruling of the court was unanimous. There were no dissenting opinions, only one concurring opinion. The majority opinion was that because discrimination places such a heavy tax on interstate commerce, it was the federal governments job to help regulate it. However the opinion went deeper than that in the fact that congress kind of killed two birds with one piece of legislation. Not only did the Civil Rights Act of 1964 help interstate as well as intrastate commerce flourish, but it also did away with an evil that had plagued American society from the get go.
Part of the argument for the plaintiff was the idea that because the hotel chain was so small, and because it was a strictly local affair, it was a state matter, and not a federal matter. Justice Warren Clark argued in the case that size was not significant, but that it would apply a squeeze in many other facets of society as well. Concurring opinion from Justice Douglass Black was that the rights of people to move freely from state to state was a more pressing matter than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel, and coal across state lines.