Arten White

The Prize Cases

Facts of the case:  After the Civil War broke out Abraham Lincoln ordered to have a blockade of Southern ports in April 1861.  Congress allowed President Lincoln to declare an insurrection state in July of 1861. During the blockade a number of ships were seized and their cargo was confiscated. Several owners of the ships declared that this was unconstitutional because the President did not have the power to unilaterally take such action. They challenged the legality of these actions all the way to the Supreme Court.

The Core Constitutional Issue:  Did Lincoln have the powers when he orderered seizures of the ships?   The Court ruled in Lincolns favor.  They determined that the constitution allows the president to respond appropriately when the nation is under attack.

Majority Opinion:  Mr Justice Grier, said that  the president is not just authorized but bound to resist force by force. 

Dissenting Opinion:  Mr. Justice Nelson said, the making of war belongs to the supreme or sovereign power of the State.

Margaret Dawson

                                                March 24 2009

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 9 Wheat. 1 1 (1824)

Facts: A New York state law gave two individuals the exclusive right to operate steamboats on waters within state jurisdiction. they had  possession of two steamboats, called the Stoudinger and the Bellona, which were actually employed in running between New York and Elizabethtown on the New York water way. This caused trouble with the federal commerce law and the state law in which they were operating. Also he had gotten a permit so that he could do his business traveling from New York to New Jersey. 

Issue: Did the State of New York exercise authority reserved exclusively to Congress, (the regulation of interstate commerce)?

Court Ruling: The Court found that New York's licensing requirement for out-of-state operators was inconsistent with a congressional act regulating the coasting trade. The New York law was invalid by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.

Opinion: Chief Justice Marshall developed a clear definition of the word commerce, which included navigation on interstate waterways. He did this so that there was to be no confusion for later cases. This made decision showed that the federal government has control over certain issue. He also committed on purposes of conducting interstate commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress.

Joshua Kerr

                                                                                    3/30/09

Brief: Gibbons v. Ogden

            Gibbons v. Ogden is rooted in a dispute between two competing ferrying company owners.  Thomas Gibbons owned a ferrying service that had been licensed by Congress as a part of regulating coastal trade.  Ogden, a competitor received an injunction from a New York court to keep Gibbons out of his area of business.    Gibbons sued over being held out of New York to do business and the case ended up in the Supreme Court in 1824.

The core constitutional question in this case is whether the navigation of goods from one place to another, in this case over water, was subject to regulation by Congress as a part of its power to regulate interstate commerce as given to it by the Commerce Clause.  Indeed the main issue was a definition of interstate commerce.  

            In a unanimous decision, the Court ruled in favor of Gibbons, meaning that the navigation of goods was a part of interstate commerce and that the interstate commerce was not limited to the transaction.

          The majority opinion was authored by Chief Justice John Marshall.  In his opinion, there was little doubt whether the transport of good from one state to another fell under the commerce clause and was therefore subject to regulation by Congress.  Navigation was clearly a part of interstate commerce.  Marshall wrote "a Congressional power to regulate navigation is as expressly granted as if that term had been added to the word 'commerce'."

Ashley Lowther

Gibbons v. Ogden

Facts: Mr. Ogden was assigned the right, from Livingston and Fulton, to operate a steamboat between New Jersey and New York. Livingston and Fulton had obtained exclusive rights to operate this maritime route for twenty years, as mandated by the NY Legislature. Mr. Gibbons was also running two boats between these same points, and he claimed they were properly licensed under the laws of the U.S. Article I, Sec. 8, Clause 3. Mr. Ogden was challenged by the New York Court of Chancey when they stopped him from operating his boats. Mr. Gibbons had a federal license under the Coasting Act of 1793 in which Congress provides the licensing of coasting trade employee vessels. Laws like this one were duplicated elsewhere which led to friction as some states would require foreign (out-of-state) boats to pay substantial fees for navigation privileges.

Issue: Whether the NY law (regulating interstate commerce)granting exclusive use of the waterways to specific members of society is unconstitutional?

Holding: No. "Navigation," as it is defined in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, allows only the Federal gov't the ability to allow or condemn commerce between foreign countries and between states.

Rule: Article One, section 9, clause 6: "No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another: nor shall vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another."

Opinion: Commerce among the states cannot stop at the external boundary line of each state, it extends within the interior. The rule does not limit the power to commerce governing solely traffic within. The rule applies to the regulation of commerce as it relates to the character of the whole government. The external concerns of the nation, the internal concerns of the States, but not limited to the concerns completely within a State. To do so otherwise would interfere with the State’s individual power. Inspection laws are regulations of commerce, and are a power retained to the States. They act upon a subject before it becomes an article of foreign commerce. NY Legislature conferred an express right to exclude all other’s from using steamboats, the Constitution grants the State of NY this power. The NY mandate and the injunction are unconstitutional, b/c Congress issued the Def license to navigate and conduct commerce therein, and Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce. Even absent the Congressional law, the New York law violates the dormant commerce clause. It is a regulation of commerce "among the states" and thus a usurpation of the commerce clause, which says only Congress may regulate interstate commerce. The New York statute regulates activity on the waters within New York State. But these waters reach to other states; and to be able to trade with another state or foreign nation, one must be able to go to where the trade is, including the waters within New York. Commerce which is completely internal is not covered by the commerce clause: "The completely internal commerce of a state, then, may be considered as reserved for the state itself." (But in this case, since the vessels reached NJ ports, the activity was not seen as completely internal to New York)

(1.) That a State may legislate in all cases of concurrent power, though Congress has acted under the same power and upon the same subject matter. (2.) That the question of supremacy cannot arise, except in the case of actual and practical collision. (3.) That such collision must be direct and positive, and the State law must operate to limit, restrict, or defeat, the effect of a statute of Congress. (4.) That in such case, the State law yields in those particulars, in which such actual collision arises, but remains valid in all other respects.

Johnson's Concurrence:

Does not regard the 1793 Coasting Vessel Act as the foundation of Gibbons' claim. Appeals to Art I Sec. 10 to support the 'negative implication' of commerce clause: even if Congress didn't enact legislation, New York's law violates the 'dormant' commerce clause. A state can't regulate commerce that is interstate--the commerce clause prevents this.

Arten White

Hammer v. Dagenhart 

Facts of the case:  The Federal Child Labor Act prohibited the shipment of interstate commerce of goods that were produce by children in factories that were under the age of fourteen.  Dagenharts son worked in his cotton mill, and he challenged the Act in federal district court. 

Core constitutional issue:  Does the congressional act violate any of the common clause?  No.   It does not regulate transportation among the states.  The act says that they are to be freely shipped after thirty days from the time of removal.

The ruling of the Court:  Upheld federal laws that banned the movement of certain goods in interstate commerce.

Majority Opinion:  Congress does not have the right to regulate commerce of goods made by children 

Dissenting Opinion: Mr. Justice Holmes thought that this was a case for upholding the exercise of all its powers by the United States.

Anna Bavido

Constitutional Law

Dr. Rutledge

24 March, 2009

Hammer v. Dagenhart

In 1916 Congress passed the Keating-Owen Act which had the goal of banning child labor.  Although that was the goal, Congress felt that the States would be supported by the Federal Courts in rejecting such a stretch of Congressional Power.  Therefore, they worded the Act so that it did not ban child labor proper; rather, it banned the interstate sale of property that had been made by children under the age of fourteen and from factories that had children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen worked more than six days a week, overnight, or more than eight hours a day.  The Act stated it sought to balance the fairness of interstate commerce because some states had already passed such restrictions at the state level and were having to compete with states that did use child labor.  Roland Dagenhart and his two minor sons, of Charlotte, North Carolina sued against the law.

Can the U.S. Congress regulate the production as well as sale of interstate commodities?  No.  Is the Keating-Owen Act of 1916 unconstitutional?  Yes.

In Justice Day’s majority opinion, the Court agreed with the Dagenharts that Congress had overstepped its bounds, arguing that the Act tried to regulate production of goods, not interstate ommerce.  In a dissenting opinion, Justice Holmes argued that goods made in one state and sold in another was the very definition of interstate commerce, and, therefore, the Act was constitutional.

Hally Kirby

Brief: Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)

Facts: Dagenhart had two sons under the age of sixteen working in his cotton mill in North Carolina. The Federal Child Labor Act of 1916 prohibited interstate commerce from produced goods from children working in factories that were under the age of fourteen, which one Dagenhart child was, and from children over the age of sixteen who worked for more than 8 hours a day or at night. Dagenhart’s oldest son was between sixteen and fourteen however, it is unknown the amount of hours or what shift he did indeed work.

Issue:  Does Congress have the power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the goods manufactured from a factory by a child since the product does not affect interstate commerce or foreign nations?

Ruling of the Court: The Court said that the Act is intended to prohibit the exploitation of child labor. The Commerce Clause only deals with commerce. The production and manufacture of these goods have nothing to do with commerce. Only after the products have been produced are they then under Congressional regulation.

Majority Opinion: “In our view, the necessary effect of this act is, by means of a prohibition against the movement in interstate commerce of ordinary commercial commodities, to regulate the hours of labor of children in factories and mines within the States, a purely state authority.” It is what is not left up to the States that is left up to the federal government. Police power was given to the States, so this appeal is not one of constitutionality therefore Congress had no right to implement such sanctions since it is a State issue.

Dissenting Opinion: Congress is given such power to regulate commerce in unqualified terms. Congress is given the enumerated power to regulate interstate commerce. If this act confers because of the powers of Congress, shouldn’t Congress be allowed to stipulate the production of such goods despite it being a State issue? It is not meddling within State laws if the product remains intrastate. The State has the power to its own internal affairs and commerce as long as it does not cross state lines. After the product crosses state lines, the States lose their right to regulate and that power in inferred towards Congress. Since regulation means the prohibition of something, Congress is within its limits of prohibiting those products as they see fit.

Bridget Tognazzini

March 13, 2009

Hammer v. Dagenhart

Facts of the case: In the first decades of the twentieth century, people were concerned about the horrible working condition of children. Unable to regulate hours and working conditions for child labor within individual states, Congress sought to regulate child labor by banning the product of that labor from interstate commerce. The Keating-Owen Act of 1916 prohibited interstate commerce of any merchandise that had been made by children under the age of fourteen, or merchandise that had been made in factories where children between the ages of 14 and 16 worked for more than eight hours a day, worked overnight, or worked more than six days a week. Roland Dagenhart, who worked in a cotton mill in Charlotte, North Carolina with his two sons, sued, arguing that this law was unconstitutional.
Core constitutional issue: Does Congress have the authority to regulate commerce of goods that are manufactured by children under the age 14, as specified in the Keating-Owen Act of 1916, and is it within the authority of Congress in regulating commerce among the states to prohibit the transportation in interstate commerce of manufactured goods by the child labor?
Ruling of the Court: The court ruled that Congress could not regulate goods that are manufactured by children; this ruling however was overturned many times. It was ruled that the Keating-Owen Act of 1916 was unconstitutional and void.

Majority opinion: Justice Day said that Congress does not have the right to regulate commerce of goods that are manufactured by children. Therefore it voided the Keating-Owen Act of 1916.

Dissenting opinion: Justice Holmes dissented strongly from the logic and ruling of the majority. He maintained that Congress was completely within its right to regulate interstate commerce. Also, those goods manufactured in one state and sold in other states were by definition interstate commerce. This places the entire manufacturing process under Congress’s eyes, and this constitutional power "could not be cut down or qualified by the fact that it might interfere with the carrying out of the domestic policy of any State."

Katy Navarro

                                                                                    3-24-09

Brief: Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964)

            Facts of the case: This case was a landmark case which immediately challenged the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which did not allow for discrimination in public places.  The Heart of Atlanta Motel was a 216-room motel in Atlanta, Georgia located near major interstates.  This motel refused to rent rooms to African Americans, which was a direct violation of this new Civil Rights Act.  The owner of the motel filed suit, arguing that the requirements of the act were beyond the scope of Congressional power over interstate commerce.  Moreover, the owner claimed that the act violated his Fifth Amendment rights to operate his business as he saw fit, which included his right to choose who he allowed to stay in his motel.  The owner argued that Congress had placed him in a position of involuntary servitude by forcing him to rent to African Americans, thus violating his Thirteenth Amendment right to no involuntary servitude.  The United States countered that the restrictions of the motel interfered with interstate travel, and that Congress was within its powers under the Commerce clause to address this situation.

          Constitutional issue: The constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to these facts.  Does Congress have the power to force the owner of the motel to adhere to the act and ban racial discrimination in public places through their control of interstate commerce?

          Court Ruling: The court delivered a majority decision by Justice Clark, with concurring opinions by Justice’s Black, Douglas, and Goldberg;  the court found that Congress did not exceed its powers under the Commerce clause by prohibiting racial discrimination in public places through Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The court said Congress was well within its jurisdiction and valid.  The court found no merit to the claims of the motel and thereby requiring the Heart of Atlanta Motel to receive business from persons of all races.

Concurring opinions were delivered by Justice’s Black, Douglas, and Goldberg.

Greg Brown

                                                                                              03-20-2009

Heart of Atlanta Motel vs. United States

     The owner of the Heart of Atlanta Motel located in Atlanta Georgia, stated that in spite of the newly passed Civil Rights Act of 1964 he intended to continue to refuse to rent rooms to black patrons.  He argued that not only did Congress not have the authority to pass such a law but that the law violated his Fifth Amendment rights by denying him the right to choose his customers and run his motel as he wanted.  The motel owner also felt that the Civil Rights Act placed him in a position of involuntary servitude because it forced him to serve customers he otherwise would not serve, thus also violating his Thirteenth Amendment rights. A district court upheld the legislation and the owner appealed to the Supreme Court.

     The court ruling was unanimous with Justice Tom Clark reading the decision. The court stated Congress had the authority to pass the Civil Rights Act.  It also denied the motel owners Thirteenth Amendment had been violated, adding that the use of this argument was “hard to conceive”.  Justice Clark added that it was clear the evidence showed there was discrimination by motels and hotels in deciding who would be allowed to rent their rooms.  Clark stated Congress had the power to regulate interstate commerce and that hotels and motels that refused customers based on race was interfering with interstate travel.

     Justice William Douglas agreed with the court but added that the decision should not be based on simply a concern for interstate commerce.  He asserted that people had a right to be free from discrimination against them which was based on race.  Douglas insisted that the movement of people from state to state “occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit and coal across state lines”. 

Student Name: Amanda Hinshaw

Date: 3-10-09

Brief: Gibbons v. Ogden

            The facts of this case revolve around steamboat operation in New York.  A New York law gave Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton alone steamboat operating rights in any water under the jurisdiction of the state of New York.  Utilizing that power, the two gave Aaron Ogden a steamboat-operating license for operation between the state of New York and New Jersey.  Thomas Gibbons, having acquired a federal operating license, disregarded Ogden’s state operating license and following monopoly of steamboat operation.  He simply ignored it and operated steamboats between a city in New Jersey and a city in New York.  Gibbons was prohibited from operating his steamboats by a New York court.  Gibbons appealed the New York court’s decision to the United States Supreme Court.

            The core constitutional issue addressed in this case is interstate commerce.  The question facing the Court was whether or not the state of New York overstepped their authority by exercising power in a situation concerning more than one state.

            The holding of the Court was in favor of Thomas Gibbons.  The Court ruled that the licensing requirement by the state of New York for an outside operator was not consistent with Congress’s coastal trade regulations.  The New York requirement was in conflict with federal regulations of trade between states and as such was invalid under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.

            The majority opinion in this case was written by Chief Justice Marshall.  He argues that the Constitution provides Congress the power to control and regulate commerce with and among all of the states.  Justice Marshall claims that commerce is left undefined in the Constitution.  It is necessary that the court settle the definition of commerce.  He defines it as more than buying or selling.  It is a type of commercial intercourse among nations or states in every branch and in the carrying out of that intercourse.  The word includes navigation and the powers necessary for that navigation as well.  In conclusion, the Constitution grants the power to regulate commercial action between states to the national not state government.  By attempting to regulate steamboat commerce between New York and New Jersey, the New York law crossed into the territory of the national government.  In doing so the law violated the Supremacy Clause and was ruled invalid.

            The concurring opinion handed down in this case was written by Justice Johnson.  He states that he approves of the decision of the court.  However he does not agree with the majority’s reasoning.  He believes the Constitution leaves little room for construction.  The power to regulate commerce lies within each state because the states are sovereign entities.  Each state has the power to control its own commerce but it cannot impede on other states’ sovereignty by attempting to regulate commerce outside its own borders.  By leaving the power to regulate commerce within its borders to individual states, the Constitution guarantees that there is no need for the federal government to get involved because the commerce power is already limited.  It is limited in that each state controls the commerce in its borders and within its borders alone.

Michelle Grimmer

                                                                                   Case Brief for Heart of Atlanta Motel v US

                                                                                   Constitutional Law

                                                                                            March 30, 2009

            Did Congress, in passing Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, exceed its Commerce Clause powers by depriving motels, such as the Heart of Atlanta, of the right to choose their own customers?

            This case was about the Heart of Atalanta Motel refusing to accept Black Americans. They were not allowed to chose who they serve because they were a place of public accommodation.

            The Court held that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to regulate local incidents of commerce, and that the Civil Right Act of 1964 passed constitutional muster. The Court noted that the applicability of Title II was "carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people. . ." The Court thus concluded that places of public accommodation had no "right" to select guests as they saw fit, free from governmental regulation.

Crystal Russell

Constitutional Law

March 30, 2009

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States

            The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited places of “public accommodation” from discrimination based on customers’ race, sex, color, religion, or national origin. The Heart of Atlanta motel challenged the constitutionality of this provision and, after losing before a three – judge federal court, appealed to the Supreme Court. President John F. Kennedy proposed the Civil Rights Act as a step toward ending discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin. President Lyndon B. Johnson obtained passage of an even stronger version of the act. The owner of a large motel in Atlanta, Georgia, which restricts its clientele to while persons, three – fourths of whom are transient interstate travelers, sued for declaratory relief and to enjoin enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, contending that the prohibition of racial discrimination in places of public accommodation affecting commerce exceeded Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause and violated other parts of the Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the prohibitions on discrimination contained in the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Thomas Clark wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. He reviewed testimony presented at congressional hearings showing that Americans had become increasingly mobile, but that African Americans were discriminated against by hotels and motels, and often had to travel longer distances to get lodging or had to call on friends to put them up overnight. Justice Clark noted that under the Interstate Commerce Act the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof incidents including local activities in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce. Justice Clare also found the Act did not deprive the motel owner of liberty or property under the Fifth Amendment. Because Congress has the right to prohibit discrimination in accommodations under the Interstate Commerce Act, the motel “has no right” to select its guests as it sees fit, free from governmental regulation.

Heart Of Atlanta
Juan Legarreta

Passed on July 2, 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 banned racial discrimination in public places, particularly in public accommodations, largely based on Congress' control of commerce. The Heart of Atlanta motel was a large, 216-room motel in Atlanta, Georgia, which refused to rent rooms to black patrons, in direct violation of the terms of the act. The owner of the motel filed suit in federal court, arguing that the requirements of the act exceeded the authority granted to Congress over interstate commerce. The owner argued that the act violated his Fifth Amendment rights to choose customers and operate his business as he wished and resulted in unjust deprivation of his property without due process of law and just compensation. Finally, the owner argued that Congress had placed him in a position of involuntary servitude by forcing him to rent available rooms to blacks, thereby violating his Thirteenth Amendment rights.

In response, the United States countered that the restrictions in adequate accommodation for black Americans severely interfered with interstate travel, and that Congress, under the United States Constitution's Commerce clause, was certainly within its power to address such matters. Moreover, they argued, the Fifth Amendment does not forbid reasonable regulation of interstate commerce and such incidental damage did not constitute the "taking" of property without just compensation or due process of law. Third, they argued that the Thirteenth Amendment applied primarily to slavery and the removal of widespread disabilities associated with it; in such kind, the Amendment certainly would not place issues of racial discrimination in public accommodations beyond the reach of Federal and state law.

The District court ruled in favor of the United States and issued a permanent injunction requiring the Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. to refrain from using racial discrimination in terms of the goods or services that it offered to guests or the general public upon its premises. The owner of the motel was Attorney Moreton Rolleston. This case was combined with the case of the future Governor of Georgia Lester Maddox concerning his Pickrick restaurant and his case to refuse to serve blacks.

On December 14, 1964, the opinion of the court was delivered by Justice Tom C. Clark, with concurring opinions by Justice Arthur Goldberg, Justice Hugo Black, and Justice William O. Douglas.

The Court held that Congress acted well within its jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce clause in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thereby upholding the act's Title II in question. While it might have been possible for Congress to pursue other methods for abolishing racial discrimination, the way in which Congress did so, according to the court, was perfectly valid. It found no merit in the arguments pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment, finding it hard to conceive that such an Amendment might possibly be applicable in restraining civil rights legislation. Having observed that 75% of the Heart of Atlanta Motel's clientele came from out-of-state, and that it was strategically located near Interstates 75 and 85 as well as two major U.S. Highways, the Court found that the business clearly affected interstate commerce. As such, it therefore upheld the permanent injunction issued by the District Court, and required the Heart of Atlanta Motel to receive business from clientele of all races

Dustin Gunnells

American Constitutional Law

Heart of Atlanta v. United States

3/24/09

            In the Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States case, the United States Supreme Court hit a landmark because the case was holding that the U. S. Congress could use the Commerce Clause power to fight discrimination. This case had a huge impact on the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We lived in a country that was dominated by segregation, a system of racial separation. But it was a time that supposedly “separate but equal,” was what was said to be going on.

            Well in the southern part of the United States in the state of Atlanta there was a motel called Heart of Atlanta Motel, which remained segregated even into the late 1960’s. In 1964 the Civil Rights Act was passed which banned racial discrimination in public places. Well the 216 room motel refused to rent rooms to black patrons, which was a direct violation of the terms of the act passed back on July 2, of 1964. The owner tried and tried to argue his case using the 5th and 13th amendments but it did not work out for him.

The District court ruled in favor of the United States and issued a permanent injunction requiting the Motel to refrain from using discrimination in terms and allow blacks to stay in the motel. This ruling was decided on December 14, 1964. It is hard to believe this kind of stuff went on but it did. The court held that Congress acted well within its jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce clause in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It may have been possible for congress to pursue other methods for abolishing racial discrimination, the way in which congress did so, according to the court was perfect.