Cooley vs. Board of wardens (1852)

Facts:  In 1803 a  Pennsylvania law required that all ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia hire a local pilot. Ships that fail to do so would be subject to a fine, which would go to a fund for retire pilots and their dependents. This fund was administered by the Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadephia. Cooley was a ship owner. He refused to hire a local pilot and he also refused to pay the fine.

Issues: Does the law violate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution?

Ruling: Justice Curtis delivered the opinion of the Court, stating that the power to ruglate commcerce includes regulation of navigation, we consider settled. We look to the nature and service performed by pilots, to the relations which that service and its compensations bear to naviation between several states, and between the ports of the United States and foreign countires, we are brought to the conslusion, that the rugulation of the qualifications of pilots, of the modes and times of offering and rendering their services, of responsibilities which shall rest upon them, of the powers they shall posses, of the compensation they may demand, and of the penalties by which their rights and duties may be enforced, do constitute regulations of navigation, and consequently of commerce, within the justmeaning of this clause of Constitution. The pilotage law did not violate the Constitution. Congress had provided in 1789 that state pilotage laws should govern. Navigation was commerce; and, piloting was navigation. Though the subject to be regulated was commerce, the interesting twist here was whether the Commerce Power was exlusive. Some subjects demand a single uniform rule for the whole nation, while others, like pilotage, demand diverse local rules to cope with varying local conditions. The power of Congress was therefore selectively exclusive.

Crystal Russell

Constitutional Law

March 30, 2009

Cooley v. Board of Wardens

            A law of the State of Pennsylvania that a vessel which neglects or refuses to take a pilot shall forfeit and pay to the master warden of the pilots, for the use of the Society for the Relief of Distressed and Decayed Pilots, their widows and children, one – half the regular amount of pilotage, is an appropriate part of a general system of regulations on the subject of pilotage, and cannot be considered as covert attempt to legislate upon another subject under the appearance of legislating on this one. The exemption of American vessels engaged in the Pennsylvania coal trade form the necessity of paying half pilotage be declared to be other than a fair exercise of legislative discretion acting upon the subject of the regulation of the pilotage of the port of Philadelphia. The law of Pennsylvania is not inconsistent with the second and third clauses of the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution, Imposts and duties on imports, exports, and tonnage were understood, when the Constitution was formed, to mean totally distinct things from fees of pilotage. Upon this point, the act of Congress passed in 1789, 1 Stat. at Large 54, recognizing the pilot laws of the States is entitled to great weight as showing that these laws neither levied duties nor gave a preference of one port over another. The more grant of the commercial power to Congress does not forbid the States from passing laws to regulate pilotage. The power to regulate commerce includes various subject, upon some of which there should be a uniform rule and upon others different rules in different localities. Congress may legislate upon the subject of pilotage throughout the United States, they have manifested an intention not to overrule the State laws except in one instance. The law of Pennsylvania, is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. The Consul was engaged in the coasting trade, sailing under a  coasting license from the United States. The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas for the city and county of Philadelphia be affirmed because this court is of opinion that the twenty – ninth section of the act of the state of Pennsylvania, of the 29th of March A.D. 1803, entitled an act to established a Board of Wardens for the port of Philadelphia, and for the regulation of pilots and pilotages, and for other purposes therein mentioned, is not, in any of its provisions involved in this cause, at variance with any of the provisions of the Constitution or laws.

Margaret Dawson   

                                                            4/6/09

Cooley v. Board of wardens (1852)

The facts are if a person is using the Philadelphia port then he or she must hire a local pilot to run the ship. Failure to do so would result in a fine, this fine was used to help fund the retirees and their kids. Mr. Cooley was a ship owner and was using the port but he did not hire a local to do dive into the port of Philadelphia so he was fined. He did not pay fine.  

What this case is being asked to figure out is if the State law violates the Commerce Clause of the Constitution?

The court ruled that it didn’t violate the Commerce Clause. The court said that the grant of the commercial power to Congress does not contain any terms in which a state may exercise its authority over the matter. The law does not conflict with any laws made by Congress in which they established the regulations for Commerce.

Majority of the opinion was the pilotage law did not violate the Constitution. Congress had provided in 1789 that state pilotage laws should govern. the interesting twist here was whether the Commerce Power was exlusive. Some subjects demand a single uniform rule and other not so. Granting that the Congress was therefore selectively exclusive.

Dustin Gunnells

American Constitutional Law

Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona

3/31/09

            Here is the case of the Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona wrapped up in one paragraph. What happened was that there was an Arizona Train Limit Law, which was established in 1912 was a law that prohibited passenger trains of more than fourteen cars and freight trains of more than seventy cars from operating in the state. They put a number of how many cars could be on a train at a single time. This would be a hard law to follow. It would be ok to follow the law on passengers but for a freight of cargo at a limit of seventy cars would be hard to do.

What happened was that the Southern Pacific Railroad violated these safety features that were put into effect back in 1912, by having a train operating longer trains on interstate routes through the state. Then Arizona brought this to the state court because of the actions of the train company. Then the ruling was that the trail court ruled in favor of the company, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed, and the Southern Pacific appealed to the Supreme Court.

When it finally came down to the gist of what the Court had actually decided was; even thought more railroad employees will be injured by “slack action” movements on long trains than on short trains, there must be no regulations of this danger in the absence of “uniform regulations.” We are not left in doubt as to why, as against the potential peril of injuries to employees, the Court tips the scales on the side of “uniformity.” For the evil it finds in a lack of uniformity is that it; delays interstate commerce, increases its costs, and impairs its efficiency. All three of thee boil down to the same thing, and that is that running shorter trains would increase the cost of railroad operations.

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona

Facts

State power to regulate the length of railroad trains is not curtailed or superseded by the Interstate Commerce Act of itself, and in the absence of administrative implementation by the Interstate Commerce Commission; nor by provisions of the Safety Appliance Act for brakes on trains; nor by the provision of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act permitting the Commission to order the installation of train stop and control devices. In enacting legislation within its constitutional authority over interstate commerce, Congress will not be deemed to have intended to strike down a state statute designed to protect the health and safety of the public unless its purpose to do so is clearly manifested, or unless the state law, in terms or in its practical administration conflicts with the Act of Congress or plainly and palpably infringes its policy. The Arizona Train Limit Law making it unlawful to operate within the State a passenger train of more than fourteen cars or a freight train of more than seventy cars as applied to interstate trains, invalid as contravening the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. The commerce clause, even without the aid of Congressional legislation, protects against state legislation which is inimical to the national commerce, and in such cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests.

Issue

Whether the total effect of the state law as a safety measure in reducing accidents is too small to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free of burdens where a uniform national regulation is needed. Holding

yes

Decision

The general rule is that the states do not have the authority to substantially impede the free flow of commerce where the need for national uniformity in laws demand that the regulation be done at the national level. However, this case lies between the two extremes of clearly needing national regulation, and clearly needing a local police measure. Thus, it calls for a balancing of the state and federal interests. The findings show that the increase in safety is small if at all. Also, if the length of trains is to be regulated, it must be done uniformly for efficiency. Since the Arizona Law is a substantial burden on commerce where a need for uniformity exists, and does not have an adequate police justification, it is unconstitutional. If one state may regulate train lengths, so may all the others, and they need not prescribe the same maximum limitation. The practical effect of such regulation is to control train operations beyond the boundaries of the state exacting it because of the necessity of breaking up and reassembling long trains at the nearest terminal points before entering and after leaving the regulating state. The serious impediment to the free flow of commerce by the local regulation of train lengths and the practical necessity that such regulation, if any, must be prescribed by a single body having a nation-wide authority are apparent. Although the seventy car maximum for freight trains is the limitation which has been most commonly proposed, various bills introduced in the state legislatures provided for maximum freight train lengths of from fifty to one hundred and twenty-five cars, and maximum passenger train lengths of from ten to eighteen cars. With such laws in force in states which are interspersed with those having no limit on train lengths, the confusion and difficulty with which interstate operations would be burdened under the varied system of state regulation and the unsatisfied need for uniformity in such regulation, if any, are evident.

Dissenting Opinions

Judge Black thought that the balancing test was best left to the legislature and not the judiciary. Judge Douglas felt that the state legislation was adequately tied to safety and thus entitled to a presumption of validity.

Ashley Lowther

Angela Pait

Case Brief: Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona

Procedural History State power to regulate the length of railroad trains is not superseded by § 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act paragraphs 117. In the absence of administrative implementation by the Interstate Commerce Commission; nor by provisions of the Safety Appliance Act for brakes on trains; nor by the provision of § 25 of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act permitting the Commission to order the installation of train stop and control devices.

Legal Issue The questions for decision are whether Congress has, by legislative enactment, restricted the power of the states to regulate the length of interstate trains as a safety measure and, if not, whether the statute contravenes the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.

Facts of Case The commerce clause, even without the aid of Congressional legislation, protects against state legislation which is inimical to the national commerce, and in such cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests.

Statement of Rule. The Arizona Train Limit Law (Arizona Code Ann., 1939, § 69-119), making it unlawful to operate within the State a passenger train of more than fourteen cars or a freight train of more than seventy cars, held, as applied to interstate trains, invalid as contravening the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution

Reasoning The findings show that the operation of long trains, that is, trains of more than fourteen passenger and more than seventy freight cars, is standard practice over the main lines of the railroads of the United States, and that, if the length of trains is to be regulated at all, national uniformity in the regulation adopted, such as only Congress can prescribe, is practically indispensable to the operation of an efficient and economical national railway system. On many railroads, passenger trains of more than fourteen cars and freight trains of more than seventy cars are operated, and, on some systems, freight trains are run ranging from one hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and sixty cars in length. Outside of Arizona, where the length of trains is not restricted, appellant runs a substantial proportion of long trains.

Holding As applied to interstate trains, invalid as contravening the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.

Dissents MR. JUSTICE BLACK: For more than a quarter of a century, railroads and their employees have engaged in controversies over the relative virtues and dangers of long trains. Railroads have argued that they could carry goods and passengers cheaper in long trains than in short trains. They have also argued that, while the danger of personal injury to their employees might, in some respects, be greater on account of the operation of long trains, this danger was more than offset by an increased number of accidents from other causes brought about by the operation of a much larger number of short trains. These arguments have been, and are now, vigorously denied.

Constitutional Law

Case Brief 7

Hally Kirby

Brief: Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona (1945)

Facts:  In 1912, Arizona passed a law prohibiting operation of railroad trains of more than 14 passenger cars or 70 freight cars within the state. At the time when the law passed, nothing seemed unreasonable concerning this regulation. However, the railroad improved as society expanded by modernizing the train tracks and by improved equipment such as locomotives. The 1912 restriction then proved to be bothersome to Southern Pacific since the average length of a train had increased from the time the law was enacted. The Southern Pacific Company had to stop its trains at the borders of New Mexico and California to shorten the length of their trains in order to avoid large fines in Arizona.

Core Constitutional Issue: State laws that affect interstate commerce, which is under regulation from the federal government, is unconstitutional if its impact is negative to the well being of interstate commerce.

Ruling of the Court: The court decided for the Southern Pacific Company, shooting down Arizona’s Train Limit Law.

Majority Opinion: The justices agreed that federal regulation alone should not displace local laws based upon safety considerations. The Justices reviewed the number of accidents in accordance to the Train Limit Law and found that the accident rate was actually higher than the national average. Despite the safety concerns with larger train lengths, the fact is that this law is within the judicial oversight because of this situation falls under the “Commerce Clause.” Since the trains flowed interstately, not just intrastate, the commerce clause gives power to regulate to the national government. The train limit law affected the flow of commerce by making the trains stop to shorten their train cars or passenger cars.  Justice Stone went on to say that it was the duty of the Courts, without the aid of Congress, to be the ultimate decider on regulations set forth by states that burden national commerce.

Dissenting Opinion: Two justices, Black and Douglas, thought that this should not be a decision left to the courts. Justice Black felt that the train limit case was a public policy issue which should be settled by elected officials, not by a court. Both agreed that federal regulations should only intrude on state transportation laws if local discrimination against interstate commerce existed. Both Justices further agreed that the longer trains were no safer and that the train limit law places a higher standard on the workers safety rather than putting economic gain above the operators’ safety.

Greg Brown

                                                                                                                        03-27-2009

Southern Pacific Company vs. Arizona

     The state of Arizona passed a law called the Arizona Train Limit Law, its intent was to limit the length of a train passing through or operating within the state Arizona.  The state wanted to limit the length of a passenger train to fourteen cars and a freight train to seventy cars.  When the Southern Pacific Railroad violated Arizona’s law the state brought action against the railroad.  The trial court ruled for the railroad while the Arizona Supreme Court ruled for the state.  The railroad then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

     In a 7-2 decision the Supreme Court ruled against the state of Arizona.  The majority ruled that states do not have the right to impede the movement of commerce from state to state.  Arizona’s claim that shorted trains improve safety was disputed by the court.  The state of Arizona felt the amount of “slack action”, which is the movement of one car before it “transmits its action to the next car” was increased by longer trains.  The court ruled there was little evidence to support that claim.  Trains in Nevada, which were unregulated, did not have any more accidents than the state of Arizona.  In fact, the court stated Arizona had a higher rate of accidents than those of un-regulated states. In order to maintain “uniformity” of railroad rules the court ruled against the state.

    Justices Black and Douglas felt there was sufficient evidence to show slack action increased in longer trains.  They seem to admonish the majority of the court by suggesting that the ruling was based more on saving cost for the railroads than for concern with safety.  Justice Black acknowledged shorter trains would cost railroads more to operate since it required more trains, but questioned whether operating cost to the railroad was a sufficient reason to ignore safety concerns    

Constitutional Law

Case Brief 7

Hally Kirby

Brief: Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona (1945)

Facts:  In 1912, Arizona passed a law prohibiting operation of railroad trains of more than 14 passenger cars or 70 freight cars within the state. At the time when the law passed, nothing seemed unreasonable concerning this regulation. However, the railroad improved as society expanded by modernizing the train tracks and by improved equipment such as locomotives. The 1912 restriction then proved to be bothersome to Southern Pacific since the average length of a train had increased from the time the law was enacted. The Southern Pacific Company had to stop its trains at the borders of New Mexico and California to shorten the length of their trains in order to avoid large fines in Arizona.

Core Constitutional Issue: State laws that affect interstate commerce, which is under regulation from the federal government, is unconstitutional if its impact is negative to the well being of interstate commerce.

Ruling of the Court: The court decided for the Southern Pacific Company, shooting down Arizona’s Train Limit Law.

Majority Opinion: The justices agreed that federal regulation alone should not displace local laws based upon safety considerations. The Justices reviewed the number of accidents in accordance to the Train Limit Law and found that the accident rate was actually higher than the national average. Despite the safety concerns with larger train lengths, the fact is that this law is within the judicial oversight because of this situation falls under the “Commerce Clause.” Since the trains flowed interstately, not just intrastate, the commerce clause gives power to regulate to the national government. The train limit law affected the flow of commerce by making the trains stop to shorten their train cars or passenger cars.  Justice Stone went on to say that it was the duty of the Courts, without the aid of Congress, to be the ultimate decider on regulations set forth by states that burden national commerce.

Dissenting Opinion: Two justices, Black and Douglas, thought that this should not be a decision left to the courts. Justice Black felt that the train limit case was a public policy issue which should be settled by elected officials, not by a court. Both agreed that federal regulations should only intrude on state transportation laws if local discrimination against interstate commerce existed. Both Justices further agreed that the longer trains were no safer and that the train limit law places a higher standard on the workers safety rather than putting economic gain above the operators’ safety.

Bridget Tognazzini

March 28, 2009

Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona (1945)

Facts of the case: In 1912 Arizona made a regulation on trains called the Arizona Train Limit Law, this law made it so that the length of passenger trains could not be longer than fourteen cars and freight rains could not be longer than seventy cars. The Southern Pacific Company was in violation of this act by having more than the required amount of cars going through Arizona. The state of Arizona fined them for the violations and took them to court to get their money. The case went before the Arizona Supreme court in which the Southern Pacific Company claimed that the Arizona law went against the commerce clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and conflicts with federal legislation. The company won in the lower courts, the Arizona Supreme court reversed it, and then the Supreme Court heard the case.
Core constitutional issues: Whether Congress had restricted the power of the states to regulate the length of interstate trains as a safety measure, if not, whether the statute breaks the commerce clause of the Constitution and the due process clause.
Ruling of the Court: In a 7-2 decision the Supreme Court ruled that the power of the state to regulate the length of interstate trains had not been restricted by Congressional action. Yet, to maintain interstate commerce, since the findings were that it would cause less accidents with longer trains they reversed the opinion of Arizona and ruled for the Southern Pacific Company.

Majority opinion: The majority opinion by Justice Stone stated that although the Arizona law was a safety measure to reduce the number of accidents attributed to the operation of trains of more than the statutory maximum length, enacted by the state legislature in the exercise of its "police power” it did not reduce the number of accidents it increased them.
Concurring opinion: The concurring opinion was by Justice Rutledge in which he concurred the result.
Dissenting opinion: Justice Black affirmed the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court, stating that the majority only ruled for the company because it delayed interstate commerce, made it cost more, and therefore made it inefficient, not anything to do with the safety of the states people.

Tasha Parker               

                                    Date: March 31, 2009

Brief: Pacific Gas & Electronic vs. State Energy Resources Consensus & Development (1983)

In the state of California that before nuclear power plants can be built. State energy commission must dictate if the capacity for storage was adequate for spent fuel rods. In this particular case two utility companies challenged the law that the provisions to federal Atomic Energy Act had “preempted this”.  The two electronic that filed for petition of the case filed because Petitioner electric utilities filed an action in Federal District Court seeking a declaration that these provisions, inter alia, are invalid under the Supremacy Clause because they felt that the law were pre-empted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The District Court, after finding that the issues presented by the two provisions were ripe for adjudication, held that they were pre-empted by and in conflict with the Atomic Energy Act.  The constitutional issue with the case was if the law in California intruded into the area of federal authority that was defined by the Atomic Energy Act.  In conclusion the court decided unanimously that the California Law did not conflict with congressional authority. The courts felt that because of the law as an economic one it did not interfere with the federal regulations regarding government of the nuclear safety. It stated that the Congress had left enough authority in the states for them to allow the development of nuclear powers to be slowed if not stopped for specific economic reasons.

Student Name: Amanda Hinshaw

Date: 3-31-09

Brief: Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona

            The facts of this case revolve around an Arizona train law, more specifically the Arizona Train Limit Law.  This law outlawed any passenger train with fifteen or more cars as well as freight trains with seventy-one or more cars operating in Arizona.  The South Pacific Rail Company violated the Arizona law by ignoring the safety regulations and operating trains over the length limit.  Arizona took the Rail Company to court in an Arizona state court where the court ruled in the favor of South Pacific Rail Company.  The case was taken before the Arizona Supreme Court where the decision of the lower court was reversed.  The Southern Pacific Rail Company appealed the Arizona Supreme Court decision to the United States Supreme Court.

            The core constitutional issue at question in this case revolved around the commerce clause.  Attempting to balance the commerce powers of the federal government and the state government requires that state regulations in commerce not unduly burden the interstate commerce powers of the federal government, more specifically Congress.  The question facing the Supreme Court was whether or not the Arizona Train Limit Law violated the Constitution by placing burdening interstate commerce.

            The Supreme Court’s holding in this case was that the Arizona Train Limit Law was unconstitutional because it did indeed place an undue burden on Congress’s commerce power.  The law imposed such a burden by burdening the railroads.  The law required railroads to use about a third more trains, break up trains, and remake them after they had pass through Arizona.  The changes cost the railroads millions of dollars each year.  The increase in trains was dangerous because it caused more accidents.

            Chief Justice Stone wrote the majority opinion for the Court in this case.  Stone argued that the Constitution’s commerce clause provides regulation power over commerce in the hands of Congress and the federal government.  However, the fact that the federal government holds that power does not prevent any power of regulation by the state.  As long as the state legislation does not conflict with a pre-established congressional commerce regulation, there is room for the state to regulate local issues even if they exert some affect on interstate commerce, even some regulatory affects.  Furthermore, Justice Stone argued, interstate regulatory matters in each state are so numerous that Congress does not have the time to deal with each matter.  State regulatory involvement will generally be upheld as within the authority of the state as long as that regulatory involvement’s impact on national commerce will not interfere in a major way with the operation of that national commerce.  The findings showed that operating trains over fourteen passenger cars and over seventy freight cars is standard operating procedure in the rest of the country.  If the length is regulated, it needs to be uniformly regulated which is an act that can only be done by congressional regulation, not state regulation.  The findings also show length of trains is directly correlated to the cost of operation and by requiring a third more trains, the Arizona Train Limit Law placed an undue financial burden on the Southern Pacific Railroad.  That financial burden was an interstate commerce burden on the rail company and since the law was shown to be unrelated to train operation safety, in fact it made it more dangerous, the interstate commerce burden produced by the law made the Arizona Train Limit Law invalid.

            Justice Black and Justice Douglas wrote the dissenting opinion in this particular case.  This justices dispute the findings citied by Chief Justice Stone in the majority opinion.  They claim the court did not find long trains to be safe.  It simply decided based on controversial evidence that numerous short trains were more dangerous than fewer long trains because of the multiple trains crossing tracks where people also cross.  The justices claim that if society’s interest can be served by regulating train length than it is a public policy matter.  Public policy is a matter the Constitution has left out of the Court’s hand and in the jurisdiction of representatives and the public.  Furthermore democracy and effective government requires it be left to the people and their representatives.