"Waco: More than Simple Blunders?"

by Joe Rosenbloom III

Wall Street Journal October 17, 1995

The sabotage of an Amtrak train in Arizona last week and the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City in April have a common element: a Waco connection. "Remember Waco" is the subtext to these flagrant crimes, either as true terrorist motive or red herring.

Mistakes that the government made at Waco are likely to be long remembered. On Feb. 28, 1993, agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms proceeded with their raid of the Branch Davidians' compound despite learning that David Koresh and his followers had been tipped off. Four ATF agents and five members of the religious sect died in a fierce gun battle. Fifty-one days later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation inserted tear gas into the compound despite a wind advisory issued by the National Weather Service for that day. When the forecast went unheeded, winds gusting to 31 miles an hour swept the tear gas out of the compound almost as fast as the FBI could inject it. The Branch Davidians dug in for six hours before lighting their compound on fire, killing 75 of the 84 people inside, including 25 children.

These serious and deplorable blunders by the ATF and the FBI smack of sloppiness and poor judgment. But a close reading of the Waco record raises deeply troubling questions about whether government officials' failure resulted merely from operational snafus or something more sinister. Two rounds of House committee hearings did not resolve this issue. Hearings scheduled by the Senate Judiciary Committee for Oct. 31 and Nov. 1 now offer the last best chance to unravel the nature of the government's conduct at Waco.

One key question is whether the architects of the ATF's Feb. 28 raid, the largest such operation in the agency's history, might have closed off their minds to less grandiose means of serving arrest and search warrants at Waco. Further legwork would have pointed to ample opportunities for nabbing Koresh outside the compound without mobilizing a small federal army to accomplish the task.
The Waco record does reveal that ATF had a keen interest in how its raid would play on the evening news. An ATF public affairs official followed orders in alerting Dallas TV stations the day before that something big was up. But documents that might elucidate how PR considerations figured into the ATF's decision-making are being withheld from the public. The Treasury Department, which oversees ATF, has ruled that pre-raid memos discussing media coverage are exempt from the Freedom of Information Act.

A second question is why the authorities failed to anticipate that the Branch Davidians might respond to the tear-gas assault by setting their compound on fire. Nowhere in the 568-page assault plan that the FBI prepared for Attorney General Janet Reno, which encompassed contingency plans for everything from medical evacuation to tear-gas decontamination, is there a reference to a fire plan. No wonder she never factored the risk of fire into her deliberations.
Yet the Branch Davidians' ramshackle compound depended, once the FBI cut-off its electricity, on candles and fuel-oil lanterns for light. Bales of hay lining the corridors as a defensive bulwark only aggravated the fire risk. The FBI knew this. Moreover, in talking with FBI negotiators, Koresh and other members of his apocalyptic sect alluded time and again to fiery biblical denouements. "Flames Await" read a sign one FBI sniper spotted in a window of the compound the day before the tear-gas assault. The record suggests that fervor within the FBI on behalf of its tear gas plan-a means to end the crisis and safely return the 250 agents who had been living on pizza for more than seven weeks to their homes-had reached such a point by the end of March 1993 as to blind the agency to the possibility of self-immolation by the Branch Davidians. Or there could be a darker explanation: that the FBI withheld the fire scenario from Ms. Reno so that she wouldn't squelch their plan.

The third unresolved question is the most corrosive: Why did Ms. Reno go from urging that the FBI hold off on its tear-gas plan-"Why now, why not wait?" she said on April 12- to endorsing it on April 16? Ms. Reno divulged one rationale, referring in congressional testimony this summer to an escalating threat in April 1993 from armed groups converging on the Branch Davidians compound from around the country. But she could cite only one example, the so-called Unorganized Militia of the United States, which she said was enroute to Waco during the standoff "either to help Koresh or to attack him."This story hardly squares with the interagency cable dispatched from the FBI's Indianapolis office in early April 1993, identifying the Unorganized Militia of the United States as just that--unorganized. It consisted of an Indianapolis attorney, according to the cable, who was planning to "drive a van with other people to Waco, Texas, and stage a protest in support of the constitutional right of assembly and to have weapons." The group would "have an assortment of shoulder weapons," the cable continued, but they "would be unloaded and used only as a form of protest." The cable is among the documents in a Waco briefing book that the FBI delivered to Ms. Reno on April 17, 1993, two days before the tear-gas assault.

The militia threat has supplanted Ms. Reno's earlier stated imperative for urgent action at Waco. She told TV reporters shortly after the fiery conclusion to the siege that she had authorized the FBI assault because "we had reports that [children] had been sexually abused, that babies had actually been beaten." The FBI quickly corrected her, saying that it never had evidence of child abuse during the 51-day standoff- a point she eventually conceded. Yet during the critical five days in April 1993 before Ms. Reno flipped on the tear-gas plan, the FBI apparently represented to her that it did have such evidence. In her debriefing four months later, she emphatically recalled that "somebody told her that babies were being beaten, because she replied, 'You mean actually beaten?'"

Child abuse is a hot-button issue for Ms. Reno. As a prosecutor in Dade County, Fla., she made a reputation as a children's advocate. Did Ms. Reno misconstrue what the FBI told her? Or did the FBI, knowing the attorney general's pressure points, snooker her into believing that child abuse in the compound was going on when there was none? When it convenes its Waco hearings, the Senate Judiciary Committee could best honor the memory of the victims in the Oklahoma City bombing and the Amtrak derailment by pursuing answers that will help all Americans determine to what extent their government acted malevolently at Waco or merely blundered.

Joe Rosenbloom is a FRONTLINE investigative reporter for "WACO-THE INSIDE STORY.”

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION

Why did the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms raid the Branch Davidian compound on February 28, 1993?
The ATF raided the Branch Davidian compound to serve arrest and search warrants as part of an investigation into illegal possession of firearms and explosives there.

Who fired first on that day, the Branch Davidians or the ATF?
The question of who fired first is in dispute. ATF agents who participated in the raid have testified in court and at a congressional hearing that the Branch Davidians fired the first shots. Right after the raid, however, one ATF agent told an investigator that a fellow agent may have shot first, when he killed a dog outside the compound. The agent later retracted the statement, saying that the Branch Davidians had initiated the gunfire. Surviving Branch Davidians have maintained that they did not shoot their guns until they were fired upon by federal authorities.

Had the Branch Davidian leader, David Koresh, been abusing children in the compound?
The issue of whether David Koresh sexually and physically abused children in the compound is also not entirely resolved. Koresh acknowledged on a videotape sent out of the compound during the standoff that he had fathered more than 12 children by several "wives" who were as young as 12 or 13 when they became pregnant. ("Why Waco?," by James D. Tabor and Eugene V. Gallagher.) A review of Waco events published by the Justice Department in October 1993 concludes, "Evidence suggested that Koresh had 'wives' who were in their mid-teens, that Koresh told detailed and inappropriate sexual stories in front of the children during his Bible study sessions, and that Koresh taught the young girls that it was a privilege for them to become old enough (i.e., reach puberty) to have sex with him." (Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, Texas February 28 to April 19, 1993.) There is considerable evidence as well that Koresh harshly disciplined the children in the compound. According to affidavits obtained by the FBI from several former Branch Davidians and from Dr. Bruce Perry, a psychiatrist who examined several Branch Davidian children, Koresh beat young children with a wooden spoon or withheld food for as much as a day to punish them. (op cit pp. 224-226)
Assuming that Koresh had been abusing children before Feb. 28, 1993, a related question is whether the abuse continued during the 51-day siege of the compound. At first Reno explained that a paramount reason for approving the tear-gas assault on April 19 was that "babies were being beaten." ("Reno Says, I Made the Decision," WPost, Apr. 20, 1993.) FBI Director Sessions, however, said the next day there was "no contemporary evidence" of child abuse. ( Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, Texas, February 28 to April 19, 1993.) And Reno revised her statement several months later, agreeing there was no evidence of ongoing child abuse by Koresh, who was wounded in the shootout on Feb. 28, at Mt. Carmel, as the Branch Davidians' residence was known. ("Waco Siege Prompts Crisis Training for Top Justice Department Officials," WPost, Dec. 9, 1993.)

Why did Attorney General Janet Reno approve the FBI's CS gas plan to end the standoff at the compound after 51 days?
Reno has cited a number of factors to explain why she endorsed the tear-gas plan. She has said that she had concluded that negotiations with the Branch Davidians were indefinitely stalemated, that the FBI's hostage rescue team on duty at Waco was becoming fatigued, that the security perimeter established by the FBI around the compound was endangered and that the children inside the compound were at risk because of deteriorating sanitary conditions and the potential for sexual and physical abuse. According to Justice Department reports and congressional testimony, Reno gave only a cursory reading of the three-inch thick operations plan and back-up documentation about CS gas provided by the FBI two days before the assault on the compound. (Joint Hearing of the Crime Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee and National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice Subcommittee of the House Government Reform and The Oversight Committee, July 1995; Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, Texas February 28 to April 19, 1993.)
[Janet Reno's opening statement before the Congressional Hearings on August 1, 1995.]

What role did President Clinton play in overseeing the handling of the crisis and in authorizing the tear-gas plan?
In the early days of the crisis Clinton endorsed a "wait-and-see" strategy, asking to be consulted before a change in strategy. On April 18, in a conversation with Reno, the President endorsed the gas plan. Although Clinton distanced himself from the matter after April 19, saying it has been Reno's call, FRONTLINE has learned that Clinton apparently followed developments at Waco closely through some of his closest White House aides.

Did the CS gas harm any of the people, especially the twenty-two children, inside the compound?
According to medical examiners who performed the autopsies, CS gas did not directly kill any of the more than 80 Branch Davidians, including 22 children, who died in the fire on April 19. Nor did anyone perish from inhalation of CS gas--or its byproduct from a fire, cyanide--the medical examiners told FRONTLINE. Other experts have told FRONTLINE that CS gas may have totally incapacitated the children and others so that when the fire occurred, it would have rendered them incapable of escape. It should be noted that Mount Carmel had not been gassed preceding the last hour of the fire. Experts also noted that CS gas only has a persistence factor of about ten minutes.

Why did the tear gas fail to roust the Branch Davidians out of the compound?
FBI agents and various experts who are familiar with the events at Waco have suggested several reasons why the CS gas did not roust the Branch Davidians out of their compound. For one thing, the adult Branch Davidians had gas masks. Holes that the FBI's armored vehicles punched in the walls of the compound to insert the gas also allowed the high winds on that day to disperse it. And, for many of Koresh's followers inside the compound, fleeing the compound and deserting him would have amounted to renouncing their religious faith; many apparently chose to stay. Furthermore, the thirty-mile winds gusting to 31 miles per hour caused the gas to quickly dissipate and FBI listening devices showed that the gas seemed to have little effect on the adult occupants during the six hour assault. All the adults had gas masks with filters, which the FBI believed would last up to 48 hours. FRONTLINE has learned that is why the FBI's initial plan called for incremental gassing over a 48 hour period.

Who started the fire that erupted a little more than six hours after the FBI began inserting the tear gas on April 19?
Although several of the surviving Branch Davidians insist that they did not start the fire, a panel of arson investigators concluded that the Davidians were responsible for igniting it, simultaneously, in at least three different areas of the compound. Unless they were deliberately set, the probability of the three fires starting almost simultaneously was highly unlikely, according to fire experts. Furthermore, the videotapes show the use of accelerants that strongly increased the spread of the fire. Although one Branch Davidian stated that a FBI tank had tipped over a lantern, videotapes show that the tank had struck the building a minute and a half before the fire began. Also some of the surviving Davidians' clothing showed evidence of lighter fluid and other accelerants. In addition, FBI listening devices seemed to establish that the Davidians were overheard making statements such as, "Spread the fuel," some six hours before the fires began. (Joint Hearing of the Crime Subcommittee July 1995.)

What caused the death of more than 80 Branch Davidians inside the compound on April 19?
Medical examiners, Dr. Nizam Peerwani and Dr. Rodney Crow, have told FRONTLINE that many of them died from asphyxiation when the intense fire raced through the compound. Others, particularly women and children who huddled under wet blankets in a concrete chamber, were fatally injured when debris collapsed on them during the fire, the officials said. Still others were shot to death, suicide or homicide victims in apparent mercy killings, they said. Both the coroners and some FBI sources have told FRONTLINE that the pattern of most of the bodies was not consistent with a theory of mass suicide.

Have any federal agents been disciplined for wrongdoing in the Waco affair? And were any of the surviving Davidians convicted of federal charges?
Two ATF supervisors, Chuck Sarabyn and Phillip Chojinacki, were fired, although they were later reinstated at a lower rank. No FBI agents have been officially disciplined. Eight of the surviving Branch Davidians were convicted on charges ranging from voluntary manslaughter to weapons violations. Seven got 40-year prison terms, and the eighth got five years. A ninth, Kathy Schroeder, got three years in prison after testifying for the government.