Case 1.3

CASE BRIEF

A case brief should be 1-2 pages. (250-500 words) The brief for each case should be submitted before the date on the work schedule. Be prepared to discuss your brief in class.

Facts: Summarize the facts of the case. List only the essential facts that you need to understand the holding and reasoning of the case.

Procedure: Most of the cases that you'll read in law school will be appellate court decisions. In this section, you want to list what happened in the lower court(s). Do not go into too much detail. One or two sentences are sufficient for this section.

Issue(s): What is/are the question(s) facing the court? Form the issue questions in a way that they can be answered by yes or no.

Holding: How did the court answer the issue question(s)? YES/NO?

Reasoning: This is the most important section of your case brief. Here you want to list the reasoning of the majority in reaching its decision. You can actually be quite detailed in this section. List what the law was before this case was decided and how the law has changed after this decision. Law professors love to discuss the reasoning of a case in class discussions.

Concurring/dissenting opinions: Even though I read the concurring and dissenting opinions, I rarely brief them. However, there are some cases (e.g. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer) where the concurring or dissenting opinions end up becoming more important than the majority's opinions. In such cases, you should add this section to your case brief.

Case 1.3 Caught Between the Separation of Powers: Local 2677, the American Federation of Government Employees v. Phillips (1973)

CASE 1.3
CAUGHT BETWEEN THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

LOCAL 2677, the AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v.
Howard J. PHILLIPS, both
Individually and in his capacity as
Opportunity, Defendant.
Civ. A. Nos. 371-73, 375-73 and 379-73.
United States District Court,
District of Columbia.
April 11, 1973.
358 F. Supp. 60

Summary
Consolidated actions by representatives of employees of Office of Economic Opportunity and Community Action Agency against acting director of Office of Economic Opportunity to declare unlawful and enjoin what they alleged to be unlawful dismantlement of Office of Economic Opportunity by defendant…[T] he District Court, William B. Jones, J., held, inter alias, that until Congress chooses to terminate Community Action Agency program before its authorization has expired, either indirectly by failing to supply funds through a continuing resolution or appropriation, or by explicitly forbidding further use of funds for the programs, acting director is obliged to continue to operate the programs as was intended by Congress, and not terminate them….

Opinion
WILLIAM B. JONES, District Judge.
These three consolidated actions have been brought to declare unlawful and enjoin what the plaintiffs alleged to be the unlawful dismantlement of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) by the defendant, Howard J. Phillips, Acting Director of OEO. The plaintiffs in Local 2677, American Federation of Government Employees, et al. v. Phillips, Civil Action No. 371-73 (hereinafter Local 2677), by an amended complaint, are the labor organization-bargaining agent for the Washington, D.C. headquarters employees of OEO, and two individual OEO headquarters employees. Suit is brought on behalf of all OEO employees throughout the country who have been or are about to be adversely affected by the alleged unlawful acts of the defendant

On January 29, 1973, President Nixon submitted his 1974 Budget Message to Congress. That budget message set forth the administration’s plan to transfer responsibility for certain OEO functions to other agencies. The message specifically notes that

No funds are requested for…[OEO] for 1974. Effective July 1, 1973, new funding for…[CAAs]
will be at the discretion of local communities… With Community Action concepts now incorporated into ongoing programs and local agencies [if the budget proposals are approved], the continued existence of OEO as a separate Federal agency is no longer necessary…

On January 29, 1973, the defendant issued a memorandum to all OEO regional offices…regarding the “termination of section 221 [CAA] funding.” That memorandum, at page two, further noted that the cessation of funding would rescind individual designations as CAAs. OEO Instruction 6730-3, issued March 15, 1973, at page two, repeats the same instruction of the defendant that CAA funding will cease and further warns that use of funds by CAA for any purpose except phasing out its activity or the failure of a CAA to submit an “acceptable” phase-out plan 120 days prior to the termination of section 221 funding will result in summary suspension of OEO funds. The same Instruction 6730-3 sets out 21 pages of guidelines for CAAs to follow in shutting down their section 221 operations, with various deadlines to be met throughout that process.

Thus,… all program evaluations and processing of CAA applications for purposes other than phasing out CAA activities have stopped. CAAs have been instructed to stop purchasing or repairing essential equipment. The day-to-day business operations of CAAs have been hindered if not halted by the willingness of third parties to deal with CAAs because of the announcement by the defendant of the termination of funding. The orderly continuation of CAA functions…has been halted or severely disrupted by the requirements imposed by OEO regarding termination. Finally, CAA employees are leaving their jobs in anticipation of the cessation of funding in compliance with OEO directives.

The defendant contends that because the budget message of the President, as the latest assessment of national needs and priorities, requests no funds for OEO to operate after June 30, 1973, the fiscally responsible course for the defendant to undertake is to phase out the CAA program that will be out of existence on July 1, 1973. In support of this theory, the defendant cities the general proposition of the law with which the plaintiffs are in total agreement—that the defendant cannot be forced to spend any funds which have not yet been appropriated. The defendant, however, goes on to argue that once the President has submitted his budget to the Congress, a program administrator must look to that message. If no funds are proposed for his agency, it is his duty to terminate that agency’ functions to effect that least “waste” of funds. Because the Court can find no support for this position in the budget act, the OEO act, the history of OEO appropriations, or the Constitution itself, the Court finds for the plaintiffs on this count.

…Assuming, as the defendant argues, that a fiscally responsible administrator must terminate programs under his supervision in the absence, as here, of either an appropriation or a budget request for funds, any program from OEO to agricultural crop subsidies could be terminated by the Executive by not requesting any funds in the budget to continue its operation. That construction would in effect give the President a veto power through the use of his budget message, a veto power not granted him by Article I, section 7, of the Constitution.

In effect the defendant argues that by use of the budget message the Executive can force the Congress to legislate to keep an authorized program from terminating. The defendant contends further that he can use the funds appropriated by Congress to run section 221 programs to terminate them and force the Congress to act before the time that it has set for itself (June, 30, 1973) to act on appropriating the funds as allowed by the authorization. Thus the Executive would effectively legislate the termination of section 221 programs before Congress has declared that they shall end. Article I, section 1, of the Constitution vests “[a] all legislative powers” in the Congress. No budget message of the President can alter that power and force the Congress to act to preserve legislative programs from extinction prior to the time Congress has declared that they shall terminate, either by its action or inaction.

An authorization does not necessarily mean that a program will continue. Congress, of course, may itself decide to terminate a program before its authorization has expired, either indirectly by failing to supply funds through a continuing resolution or appropriation, or by explicitly forbidding the further use of funds for the programs…. But Congress has not chosen either of these courses, although it may in the future. Until that time, historical precedent, logic, and the text of the Constitution itself obligate the defendant to continue to operate the section 221 programs as was intended by the Congress, and not terminate them.

In the present case, the Congress has not directed that funds be granted to any particular CAA. The OEO Director has been granted discretion in the disbursing of funds so as to effectuate the goals of the program… But discretion in the implementation of a program is not the freedom to ignore the standards for its implementation…. An administrator’s responsibility to carry out the Congressional objectives of a program does not give him the power to discontinue that program, especially in the face of a Congressional mandate that it shall go on.

Congress has told the Director of OEO through its authorization that it intends that section 221 programs continue. Until Congress changes that command, the defendant is bound to honor it. Counsel for the defendant urged at oral argument that unless the defendant ignored that Congressional command and terminated section 221 programs, financial chaos would result on July 1, 1973, if the Congress failed to include OEO in continuing resolution or pass an appropriation bill. This Court will not presume that Congress will act in such an irresponsible manner, any more than it assumes that the defendant is acting in bad faith in his assertion of the duty to terminate section 221 funding. But Congress has shown how the problem posed by counsel for the defendant would be solved in its past action termination funding for the SST program… Funds were appropriated “[f} or expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary for the termination of development of the civil supersonic aircraft and to refund the contractors’ cost shares, $97, 300,00, to remain available until expended.” Pub.L. No. 92-18, 85 Stat. 40. Thus when Congress orders that a program go forth and later changes its mind, it is for the Congress in the responsible exercise of its legislative power to make provisions for termination. Until those provisions are made, the function of the Executive is to administer the program in accord with the legislated purposes.