Case 2.4

CASE BRIEF

A case brief should be 1-2 pages. (250-500 words) The brief for each case should be submitted before the date on the work schedule. Be prepared to discuss your brief in class.

Facts: Summarize the facts of the case. List only the essential facts that you need to understand the holding and reasoning of the case.

Procedure: Most of the cases that you'll read in law school will be appellate court decisions. In this section, you want to list what happened in the lower court(s). Do not go into too much detail. One or two sentences are sufficient for this section.

Issue(s): What is/are the question(s) facing the court? Form the issue questions in a way that they can be answered by yes or no.

Holding: How did the court answer the issue question(s)? YES/NO?

Reasoning: This is the most important section of your case brief. Here you want to list the reasoning of the majority in reaching its decision. You can actually be quite detailed in this section. List what the law was before this case was decided and how the law has changed after this decision. Law professors love to discuss the reasoning of a case in class discussions.

Concurring/dissenting opinions: Even though I read the concurring and dissenting opinions, I rarely brief them. However, there are some cases (e.g. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer) where the concurring or dissenting opinions end up becoming more important than the majority's opinions. In such cases, you should add this section to your case brief.

Case 2.4

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DISOBEY

Harley v. Schuylkill County et al.

1979

Civ. A. No. 78-861.
United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.
Aug. 23, 1979. 476 F. Supp. 191
Summary
Discharged prison guard filed civil rights suit against county and warden, alleging that his discharge was wrongful in that it was a deprivation of his liberty interest without according him due process, constituted a violation of his First Amendment rights, was based on his refusal to perform an unconstitutional act, and constituted a violation of rights secured under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The District Court held that: (1) the right to refuse to perform an unconstitutional act is a right "secured by the Constitution." Accordingly the prison guard had the right to refrain from performing an act, ordered by the warden, which would have deprived prisoner of his constitutional rights, and (2) a county is liable for acts of its employees which violate Article 1, Section I of the Pennsylvania Constitution, where those employees are acting within the scope of their official duties.
Motion Denied.
Opinion
District Judge Huyett:

Plaintiff John R. Harley has brought this civil rights action, raising a variety of theories in support of his request for relief…

There now remain[s] before us ... [the] issue [ ] for decision: ... whether the right to refuse to perform an unconstitutional act is a "right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; ...
The complaint alleges that plaintiff John Harley was employed by the Schuylkill County Prison as a prison guard. On February 28, 1976, plaintiff reported to work on the second shift and was informed by the Acting Deputy of the First Shift that defendant Joseph Dooley, at that time the Acting Warden had left orders that inmate Kenneth Hennessey was to "stand check" in front of his cell, even if he had to be dragged from his cell.... Upon examining Hennessey, plaintiff discovered that the inmate had previously been beaten and, in fact, Hennessey informed plaintiff that he had been dragged from his cell and beaten because he refused to stand check.... Hennessey further informed plaintiff that he had refused to stand check because of his religious beliefs....

Plaintiff determined that Hennessey intended to refuse to stand check again, and that at that time, under the circumstances, the only way that the "check could be effectuated would have been to use unwarranted force, which would aggravate Hennessey's injuries.". . . Plaintiff then proceeded, at the time of the first check, to secure Hennessey's cell and file a conduct report instead of forcing Hennessey to stand check....

Later that evening, plaintiff informed Dooley of these events and stated that in plaintiff’s opinion further physical abuse of Hennessey would be illegal and improper under the circumstances.... Dooley stated that he wanted Hennessey to stand check no matter what the circum stances and insisted that Hennessey be dragged from his cell.... Plaintiff continued to refuse to obey this order because he felt that it was immoral and illegal. The complaint further alleged that the orders given by Dooley were unconstitutional, and that "their effectuation deprived Hennessey of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights, and such orders, if carried out by plaintiff, would have subjected plaintiff to liability for such unconstitutional acts.". . -

The Commissioners' reasons for discharging plaintiff were widely reported in area newspaper articles. According to those reports, plaintiff was discharged for causing dissension between Dooley and the guards in the second shift.... One of the defendants also appeared on a radio talk show and stated that plaintiff was dismissed for insubordination....

Plaintiff alleges that the reasons given for his discharge were false. Finally, plaintiff alleges that, as a result of his discharge and the resultant injury to his good name and reputation, he was unable to find employment for approximately one year.... Additionally, plaintiff alleges that his political affiliation was a substantial factor in his discharge....

Plaintiff is asserting a right personal to him; the right to refuse an order which would result in the violation of another's constitutional rights. The question presented here is whether this "right" is a “right[s], privileges, or immunit[y] se- cured by the Constitution and laws."

We are confident that the right to refuse to violate another's federal constitutional rights is a right secured by the constitution.

Under the facts as alleged in the complaint, plaintiff would have been liable for a deprivation of Hennessey's constitutional rights if he had proceeded to obey the order given to him.... To put the matter another way, plaintiff had a clear duty under the constitution to refrain from acting in a manner that would deprive Hennessey of his constitutional rights. If plaintiff is under a duty to refrain from performing an act, then we believe that he has the concurrent right to so act. To hold otherwise would create an unconscionable burden upon one charged with the duty to uphold another's constitutional rights.
The issue remaining is whether that right is one "secured by the Constitution." The duty to refrain from acting in a manner which would deprive another of constitutional rights is a duty created and imposed by the constitution itself. It is logical to believe that the concurrent right is also one which is created and secured by the constitution. Therefore, we hold that the right to refuse to perform an unconstitutional act is a right "secured by the Constitution" within the meaning of § 1983.

We believe that our conclusion is sup ported by strong policy considerations. Parties such as plaintiff, who are acting in the capacities of prison administrators, policemen and the like, may daily be faced with situations where they are required to act in a manner which is consonant with the constitutional rights of others who are subject to their authority. The potential for abuse in these situations scarcely needs to be mentioned. If such persons are to be encouraged to respect the constitutional rights of others, they must at least have the minimal assurance that their actions are also protected by the constitution in those cases where they are confronted with the difficult choice of obeying an official order or violating another's constitutional rights.