Case 4.1

Due Process versus Arbitrary Means: Kolender v. Lawson (1983)

Summary

A California statue requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to identify themselves and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer. The California Court of Appeal has construed the statute to require a person to provide “credible and reliable” identification when requested by a police officer who has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a stop under the standards of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. The California court has defined “credible and reliable” identification as “carrying reasonable assurance that the identification is authentic and proving means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself.” Appellee, who had been arrested and convicted under the statute, brought an action in Federal District Court challenging the statute’s constitutionality. The District Court held the statute unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The statute, as drafted and as construed by the state court, is unconstitutionally vague on its face within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to clarify what is contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a “credible and reliable” identification. As such, the statute vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statue and must be permitted to go on his way in the absence of probable cause to arrest.

Opinion

Justice O’ Connor delivered the opinion of the court.
This appeal presents a facial challenge to a criminal statute that requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a “credible and reliable” identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer under circumstances that would justify a stop under the standards of Terry V. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1986). We conclude that the statute as it has been construed that the statute as it has been construed is unconstitutionally vague within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to clarify what is contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a “credible and reliable” identification. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court below.

I

Appelle Edward Lawson was detained or arrested on approximately 15 occasions between March 1975 and January 1977 pursuant to Cal. Penal Code Ann. 647 (e) (West 1970). Lawson was prosecuted only twice, and was convicted once. The second charge was dismissed.
Lawson then brought a civil action in the District Court for the Southern District of California seeking a declaratory judgment that 647(e) is unconstitutional, a mandatory injunction to restrain enforcement of the statute, and compensatory and punitive damages against the various officers who detained him. The District Court found that 647(e) was overboard because “a person who is stopped on less than probable cause cannot be punished for failing to identify himself”…. The District Court enjoined enforcement of the statute…
Appellant H. A. Porazzo, Deputy Chief Commander of the California High-way Patrol, appealed the District Court decision to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit… The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court determination as to the unconstitutionality of 647(e)…. The appellate court determined that the statute was unconstitutional in that it violates the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, it contains a vague enforcement standard that is susceptible to arbitrary enforcement, and it fails to give fair and adequate notice of the type of conduct prohibited…
The officers appealed to this Court…

II

Our Constitution is designed to maximize individual freedoms within a frame-work of ordered liberty. Statutory limitations on those freedoms are examined for substantive authority and content as well as for definiteness or certainty of expression…
As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement… Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine “is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine- the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” … Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines sweep (that) allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.”…
Section 647 (e), as presently drafted and as construed by the state courts, contains no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy the requirement to provide a “credible and reliable” identification. As such, the statute vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute and must be permitted to go on his way in the absence of probable cause to arrest. An individual, who police may think is suspicious but do not have probable cause to believe has committed a crime, is entitled to continue to walk the public streets “only at the whim of any police officer” who happens to stop that individual under 647(e)… Our concern here is based upon the “potential for arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties…” … In addition, 647(e) implicates consideration of the constitutional right to freedom of movement…
Section 647(e) is not simply a “stop-and-identify” statute. Rather, the statute requires that the individual provide a “credible and reliable” identification that carries a “reasonable assurance” of its authenticity, and that provides “ means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself.”…
In addition, the suspect may also have to account for his presence “to the extent it assists in producing credible and reliable identification.”…
At oral argument, the appellants confirmed that a suspect violates 647(e) unless “ the officer (is) satisfied that the identification is reliable,”… In giving examples of how suspects would satisfy the requirement, appellants explained that a jogger, who was not carrying identification, could, depending on the particular officer, be required to answer a series of questions concerning the route that he followed to arrive at the place where the officers detained him, or could satisfy the identification requirement simply by reciting his name and address…
It is clear that the full discretion accorded to the police to determine whether the suspect has provided a “credible and reliable” identification necessarily “entrust (s) lawmaking ‘to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat.’”… Section 647(e) “furnishes a convenient tool for ‘harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure,’ “… and “confers on police a virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation.”… In providing that a detention under 647(e) may occur only where there is the level of suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry stop, the State ensures the existence of “neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.”…
Although the initial detention is justified, the State fails to establish standards by which the officers may determine whether the suspect has complied with the subsequent indentification requirements.
Appellants stress the need for strengthened law enforcement tools to combat the epidemic of crime that plagues our Nation. The concern of our citizens with curbing criminal activity is certainly a matter requiring the attention of all branches of government. As weighty as this concern is, however, it cannot justify legislation that would otherwise fail to meet constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity… Section 647(e), as presently construed, requires that “suspicious” persons satisfy some undefined identification requirement, or face criminal punishment. Although due process does not require “impossible standards” of clarity, this is not a case where further precision in the statutory language is either impossible or impractical.



Allison Pappan's Summary

This case is essentially about due process under the law and if California's statute which, requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to identify themselves and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer by producing “credible and reliable” identification when requested by a police officer who has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a stop s in direct violation of the due process clause in the constitution. It appears that the police department was trying to protect the public at the expense of its citizens constitutionally guaranteed individual rights. I feel that the police officer was just trying to do his job and keep things on the street right. The California statute is literally written to say, any one loitering or wandering on the streets is to “identify themselves and to account for their presents when requested by a peace officer.” The Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional in that it was vague on its face (unclear) within the meaning and protection of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Since we are talking about this case I should keep the focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case, the Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior. The Court found that the searches undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation. The defendant in this case was arrested 15 times in two years and was only convicted once. I feel that in this case it looks like the officers were singling him out and harassing behavior was used. Arresting individuals who do not have valid identification is unconstitutional, with or without a warrant. I agree with this. I know that there are many times that I don’t have any identification on me and I would hate to be arrested for not having any on me.