Case 5.1 Due Process and Efficient Process: Cleveland Board of Education v. Laudermill (1985)Cleveland Board of Education vs. Loudermill, et al., Case No. 470 US 532
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, No. 83-1362 / Argued December 3, 1984 – Decided March 19, 1985

Summary:
In No. 83-1362, petitioner Board of Education hired respondent Loudermill as a security guard. On his job application Loudermill stated that he had never been convicted of a felony. Subsequently, upon discovering that he had in fact been convicted of grand larceny, the Board dismissed him for dishonesty in filling out the job application. He was not afforded as opportunity to respond to the dishonesty charge or to challenge the dismissal. Under Ohio law, Loudermill was a “classified civil servant,” and by statute, as such an employee, could be terminated only for cause and was entitled to administrative review of the dismissal. He filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission, which, after hearings before a referee and the Commission, upheld the dismissal some nine months after the appeal had been filed. Although the Commission’s decision was subject to review in the state courts, Loudermill instead filed suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the Ohio statute providing for administrative review was unconstitutional on its face because it provided no opportunity for a discharged employee to respond to charges against him prior to removal, thus depriving him of liberty and property without due process. It is also alleged that the statute was unconstitutional as applied because discharged employees were not given sufficiently prompt post removal hearings. The District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, holding that because the very statute that created the property right in continued employment also specified the procedures for discharge, and because those procedures were followed, Loudermill was, by definition, afforded all the process due; that the post-termination hearings also adequately protected Loudermill’s property interest; and that in light of the Commission’s crowded docket the delay in processing his appeal was constitutionally acceptable. In No. 83-1363, petitioner Board of Education fired respondent Donnelly from his job as a bus mechanic because he had failed an eye examination. He appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which ordered him reinstated, but without back pay. He then filed a complaint in Federal District Court essentially identical to Loudermill’s, and the court dismissed for failure to state a claim. On a consolidated appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed in part and remanded, holding that both respondents had been deprived of due process and that the compelling private interest in retaining employment, combined with the value of presenting evidence prior to dismissal, outweighed the added administrative burden of a pretermination hearing. But with regard to the alleged deprivation of liberty and Loudermill’s 9-month wait for an administrative decision, the court affirmed the District Court, finding no constitutional violation.

Held: All the process that is due is provided by a pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with post-termination administrative procedures as provided by the Ohio statute; since respondents alleged that they had no chance to respond, the District Court erred in dismissing their complaints for failure to state a claim.

Opinion

Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. In these cases we consider what pretermination process must be accorded a public employee who can be discharged only for cause.

I.
In 1979 the Cleveland Board of Education, petitioner in No. 83-1362, hired respondent James Loudermill as a security guard. On his job application, Loudermill stated that he had never been convicted of a felony. Eleven months later, as part of a routine examination of his employment records, the Board discovered that in fact Loudermill had been convicted of grand larceny in 1968. By letter dated November 3, 1980, the Board’s Business Manager informed Loudermill that he had been dismissed because of his dishonesty in filling out the employment application. Loudermill was not afforded an opportunity to respond to the charge of dishonesty or to challenge his dismissal. On November 13, the Board adopted a resolution officially approving the discharge.

Under Ohio law, Loudermill was a “classified civil servant”…Such employees can be terminated only for cause, and may obtain administrative review if discharged…Pursuant to this provision, Loudermill filed an appeal with the Cleveland Civil Service Commission on November 12. The Commission appointed a referee, who held a hearing on January 29, 1981. Loudermill argued that he had thought that his 1968 larceny conviction was for a misdemeanor rather than a felony. The referee recommended reinstatement. On July 20, 1981, the full Commission heard argument and orally announced that it would uphold the dismissal. Proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law followed on August 10, and Loudermill’s attorneys were advised of the result by mail on August 21.

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The other case before us arises on similar facts and followed a similar course. Respondent Richard Donnelly was a bus mechanic for the Parma Board of Education. In August 1977, Donnelly was fired because he had failed an eye examination. He was offered a chance to retake the examination but did not do so. Like Loudermill, Donnelly appealed to the Civil Service Commission. After a year of wrangling about the timelines of his appeal, the Commission heard the case. It ordered Donnelly reinstated, though without back pay. In a complaint essentially identical to Loudermill’s Donnelly challenged the constitutionality of the dismissal procedures.

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II

Respondents’ federal constitutional claim depends on their having had a property right in continued employment…If they did; the State could not deprive them of this property without due process…

Property interests are not created by the Constitution, “they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law…”…The Ohio statute plainly creates such an interest. Respondents were “classified civil service employees,” entitled to retain their positions “during good behavior and efficient service,” who could not be dismissed “except…for…misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office”…The statute plainly supports the conclusion, reached by both lower courts, that respondents possessed property rights in continued employment. Indeed, this question does not seem to have been disputed below.

The Parma Board argues, however, that the property right is defined by, and conditioned on; the legislature’s choice of procedures for its deprivation…The Board stresses that in addition to specifying the grounds for termination, the statute sets out procedures by which termination may take place. The procedures were adhered to in these cases. According to petitioner, “[t]o require additional procedures would in effect expand the scope of the property interest itself”…

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...It is settled that the “bitter with the sweet” approach [argued by the Parma Board] misconceives the constitutional guarantee. If a clearer holding is needed, we provided it today. The point is straight-forward: the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights – life, liberty, and property – cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories of substance and procedure are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology. “Property” cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any more than can life or liberty. The right to due process “is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards”…
In short, once it is determined that the Due Process clause applies, “the question remains what process is due”…The answer to that question is not to be found in the Ohio statute.

III
An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property “be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case”…We have described “the root requirement” of the Due Process Clause as being “that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest”…This principle requires “some kind of a hearing” prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment…Even decisions finding no constitutional violation in termination procedures have relied on the existence of some pretermination opportunity to respond…

The need for some form of pretermination hearing…is evident from a balancing of the competing interests at stake. These are the private interest in retaining employment, the governmental interest in the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous termination. See Mathews vs. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

First, the significance of the private interest in retaining employment cannot be gainsaid. We have frequently recognized the severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood…While a fired worker may find employment elsewhere, doing so will take some time and are likely to be burdened by the questionable circumstances under which he left his previous job…

Second, some opportunity for the employee to present his side of the case is recurringly of obvious value in reaching an accurate decision. Dismissals for cause will often involve factual disputes…Even where the facts are clear, the appropriateness or necessity of the discharge may not be; in such cases, the only meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decision maker is likely to be before the termination takes effect…

The case before us illustrates these considerations. Both respondents had plausible arguments to make that might have prevented their discharge. The fact that the Commission saw fit to reinstate Donnelly suggests that an error might have been avoided had he been provided an opportunity to make his case to the Board. As for Loudermill, given the Commission’s ruling we cannot say that the discharge was mistaken. Nonetheless, in light of the referee’s recommendation, neither can we say that a fully informed decision maker might not have exercised its discretion and decided not to dismiss him, notwithstanding its authority to do so. In any event, the termination involved arguable issues, and the right to a hearing does depend on a demonstration of certain success…

The governmental interest in immediate termination does not outweigh these interests. As we shall explain, affording the employee and opportunity to respond prior to termination would impose neither a significant administrative burden nor intolerable delays. Furthermore, the employer shares the employee’s interest in avoiding disruption and erroneous decisions; and until the matter is settled, the employer would continue to receive the benefit of the employee’s labors. It is preferable to keep a qualified employee on than to train a new one. A governmental employer also has an interest in keeping citizens usefully employed rather than taking the possibly erroneous and counterproductive step of forcing its employees onto the welfare rolls. Finally, in those situations where the employer perceives a significant hazard in keeping the employee on the job, it can avoid the problem by suspending with pay.

IV
The foregoing considerations indicate that the pretermination “hearing”, though necessary, need not be elaborate. We have pointed out that “[t]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.”…In general, “something less” than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action…Under state law, respondents were later entitled to a full administrative hearing and judicial review. The only question is what steps were required before the termination took effect.

In only one case, Goldberg vs. Kelly…(1970), has the court required a full adversarial hearing prior to adverse governmental action. However,…that case presented significantly different considerations than are present in the context of public employment. Here, the pretermination hearing need not definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge. It should be an initial check against mistaken decisions – essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action…

The essential requirements of due process and all that respondents seek or the Court of Appeals required, are notice and an opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should be taken is a fundamental due process requirement.

The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story…To require more than this prior to termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee.

V

Our holding rests in part in the provisions in Ohio law for a full post-termination hearing…

VI
We concluded that all the process that is due is provided by a pretermination opportunity to respond coupled with post-termination administrative procedures as provided by the Ohio statute…